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Some Question Logic of Multinational Defense Programs |
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(Source: World Politics Watch; issued Aug. 30, 2006)
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((c) World Politics Watch; reprinted with permission)
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By teaming up with allied nations on defense acquisition programs, the United States hopes to reduce the cost of weapons such as the Joint Strike Fighter, the next-generation fighter aircraft for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. But some question the benefits of cost-sharing with other countries. In the view of one defense analyst, such arrangements limit U.S. decision-making flexibility and offer little in return.
"It's a huge impediment to the American strategic debate" to conduct big defense procurement programs in conjunction with allies, according to Michael O'Hanlon, senior fellow in foreign policy studies at The Brookings Institution, a Washington-based think tank.
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program offers a striking case in point, according to O'Hanlon.
Technically, JSF is a joint program of the U.S. Air Force and Navy, and the U.K. Royal Air Force and Royal Navy. However, seven other allied nations have invested in the program's development and are expected to buy units of the finished aircraft.
The effect, in O'Hanlon's view, is to give these nations a voice in running the program, thus limiting the ability of U.S. defense planners to run the program in a way that best suits American priorities and interests.
The entanglements with other countries makes it harder to change the program," he said.
The stakes, certainly in the case of JSF, are enormous. JSF is the highest-priced defense program in history, now exceeding a total of $276 billion, according to the Pentagon. The United States is the largest contributor by far.
"[But] we can't even debate this [program], because it's seen as undercutting NATO if we do," O'Hanlon said.
The seven other partner nations in the JSF program are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Turkey.
There might be very sound reasons for the Pentagon to change a program mid-course, or reconsider it altogether, O'Hanlon said. That is very much the case with JSF, he said, calling it "a misguided program" with too many airplanes being built at too high a cost.
Lockheed Martin Corp., the program's prime contractor, has projected that it would build around 2,600 of the aircraft for the United States and Britain, combined, over the 2007-2027 period.
Buying nearly 3,000-odd JSF planes, at a pricetag approaching $100 million each, O'Hanlon said, "is crazy."
The fast, stealthy JSF fighter is simply overkill, he said, given that the United States has other aircraft that are "pretty good bomb droppers" when flying up against the mediocre air forces that they may expect to oppose.
But the involvement of alliance partners in the program inhibits rational debate within the United States about the merits of the program, according to O'Hanlon.
"We're locked in," he said.
If the Pentagon were to consider changes in the JSF program -- for instance, question the validity of developing three separate variants of the aircraft, as now planned -- it would hesitate to voice such views for fear of bringing on accusations of "American unilateralism," O'Hanlon said.
O'Hanlon and other defense analysts believe it is imperative to examine defense programs critically at every stage of their development, and even in some cases to recommend their termination. "I feel encumbered as an analyst," O'Hanlon said, because of the alliance issues that come into play with a joint program such as JSF.
"It's hard . . . to cancel weapons [as it is]. The odds are against cancellation. The playing field is against us" -- that is, against critics of programs. The armed services tend to defend their acquisition programs, as do the companies that produce the weapons; then add the weight of foreign countries as partners, and programs become virtually unassailable, O'Hanlon said.
"It's so hard to cancel weapons in general, but [with multinational partnerships], we're making it even harder," he said.
What does the United States gain for having eight or more other countries participate in such a program and, at least indirectly, have a vote in running it?
Not much, according to O'Hanlon. The allies' participation saves the United States only a few percentage points of the program's cost, he said.
Yet O'Hanlon is not optimistic that the United States will avoid such allied acquisition programs in future.
American defense officials will go on buying into the allied approach to acquisitions, he said, because "they start from the assumption that the program would go ahead anyway," and the foreign participation is a way to help defray the program's cost.
But that little bit of cost-saving, in O'Hanlon's view, may only serve to handcuff U.S. defense planners over the long haul.
Loren Thompson, another defense analyst familiar with the JSF program, differs in his view. "Although [JSF] is in principle a multinational program, all the key decisions in the near term will be shaped by the . . . U.S. military services who plan to buy it," said Thompson, who is chief operating officer at the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Va.
"The Pentagon is footing 90 percent of the bill for JSF," so the allies become a rather secondary concern, according to Thompson.
That is the case even though the allies complain that their views are not taken adequately into account with respect to the JSF program, he said.
On the other hand, Thompson noted, the United States did pay attention when key ally Britain complained about having inadequate access to underlying JSF technology.
"When the British shot their cannon across the bow of the Bush administration" on the matter of sharing the JSF technology, the Bush administration sat up and took notice and was responsive, Thompson said.
"It's too early to say how the JSF program will turn out," Thompson said. "But there's a great deal of dissatisfaction within the Pentagon with [having] too many players with a veto." Having multiple armed services with veto power over a program is bad enough, he said, "much less [having] a slew of others [from abroad]."
The F-35 JSF was officially named the "Lightning II" by Defense Department officials in early July. The aircraft's inaugural flight is scheduled for later this year.
-ends-
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