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Extracts From Pentagon Regular Briefing, Nov. 30 |
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(Source : US Department of Defense ; issued Nov. 30, 2000)
(Editor's Note: The following is extracted from the transcript of the Pentagon's Nov. 30 press briefing, during which officials responded to questions about the operational readiness and effectiveness of the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor.)
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Pentagon Spokesman Ken Bacon briefed. Bacon was joined by Marine Corps Brig. Gen. James F. Amos, deputy assistant commandant for Marine Corps Aviation)
Q: Ken, regarding a somewhat critical Coyle report on the MV- 22, does the SECDEF believe that the tilt rotor plane is ready for full-scale production and use by the Marine Corps in any situation?
Bacon: Well, first of all, the Coyle report believes that the MV-22 is ready for production. And it says that. So I don't believe the secretary has been briefed on the Coyle report. I know that Mr. Coyle himself has not briefed him. I do also know that the commandant has kept the secretary fully informed about progress on the V-22 Osprey. As you recall, several years ago the secretary went down and saw the Osprey when it landed here next to the Pentagon and went aboard the Osprey with the commandant and some member of Congress. It's a program in which he's been very interested. And he shares the commandant's view that this is an exciting and important new development in Marine aviation and a very worthy successor to the CH- 46 helicopter.
Q: Yeah, just to follow up on the V-22. The Coyle report said that it found that it was -- that the MV-22 as tested was, quote, not operationally suitable because of reliability, maintainability, availability, human factors, and interoperability issues." That doesn't sound like a good thing. Can you explain why it's considered to be operationally effective but not operationally suitable? What are they talking about? Is this a maintenance -- is there a problem with the plane? Was there a maintenance problem or what --what are we talking about here?
Bacon: Well, first I have Brigadier General Amos from the Marine Corps here who will answer specific questions. But let me just say, based on my cursory review of the two-inch thick report -- I know you've probably read it all, but I haven't -- and a brief conversation with Mr. Coyle and a conversation with the commandant, General Jones, about this, my assessment of this is as follows: that the development of anew airplane is an evolutionary process. You never reach a point where you've achieved perfection with the plane. You are always looking for ways to improve its performance, its maintainability, its reliability, and its safety. And that with any piece of technology, particularly a dramatically new departure from past technology and its introduction into the force, there's a learning curve. And that that learning curve continues throughout the life of the airplane. I think that that's what's happened here.
The Marines have already made a number of improvements. I think they've made over a hundred improvements -- nearly a 120 improvements in the plane since they first started producing it. Those improvements will continue. The new improvements will be made on top of the 120-odd improvements that have been made already. As Marines who maintain the planes learn more about maintaining them, the maintenance will get better. And one of the reasons that we have Phil Coyle at the Pentagon -- one of the reasons that we have an independent Office of Test and Evaluation is in order to give the services guidance and direction for how to make their equipment better and to make it more reliable and more effective in combat.
And I think that the Marines will take the Coyle report and use it as a guidebook for making improvements in the Osprey. Now, that's a general -- a very general description. I can go into some very specific changes that the Marines have already made, but I think I will leave that to Brigadier General Amos to do that right now. And then, if you have more general policy questions, I'll come back.
Q: A general policy DoD question. The report, which I read several times -- two inches -- leaves the impression that the O&S [operation and support] costs for this thing in the out years, the years beyond after you and the other Marines leave, is going to be pretty high, more of a burden than the Marines anticipate now. This building, for the last seven or eight years, has talked about how weapons programs must be both effective and cost effective in the out years to be purchased or to be approved. This report raises reasonable doubt that this airplane has O&S costs that may be astronomical right now that the Marines won't be able to pay. Can you address, I mean, the dichotomy here? OSD says one thing. This report applies quite another.
Bacon: Well, I know what the report says, and I know the report makes comparisons between the V-22 and the CH-46 helicopter. To a certain extent, these comparisons overlook, I think, one central fact, which is the CH-46 helicopters cannot remain flying forever and they have to be replaced by something. As the report points out, the V-22 Osprey brings considerably greater combat capability to the Marine Corps than it's currently getting from the CH-46 helicopters, which have been in the force since 1964, I believe. So they have to replace the helicopters with something. They've chosen a new technology. The report points out that the new technology does bring additional combat capability, and in some respects, in terms of combat survivability, it even exceeds the standards that were initially set for the V-22.
In terms of the cost of making the plane operate, the cost of keeping the plane operating, it does conclude that they could be lower. And the Marines are confident that the costs will be lower, and that they will get lower as they begin to get this into the force and they begin working on the plane. And as they make more changes in the plane, as they've made already -- they've made -- one of the fundamental changes they've made is fixing difficulties they had in folding and stowing the wings. That's a change they've made already. They've made another change in the instruction manuals for educating people in how to maintain the plane. They've made another fundamental change in fasteners -- sounds simple, but it was a problem the plane was having attaching cables and other things to the composite material. They've improved that dramatically. As I said, they've made nearly 120 improvements already. They will continue to make more improvements.
The question to be asked is whether the improvements will change this trajectory. The Marines are confident that it will. And I suppose the only way we're going to know this is to come back in a year or two or three, and look at the cost of maintaining the plane, of keeping it operational, and finding out if they have made the type of progress that they think they can make. But let me have General Amos come up and discuss some of the specifics on that.
Amos: Maybe I can shed a little bit of light on things from a couple of different perspectives, both the operational and maybe the programmatic.
The first thing I'd like to say is, you've got to remember that there were two test and evaluation organizations that looked at this airplane as it went through both operational evaluation and came out the other end, with the appropriate report. The first was OPTEVFOR, Operational Test and Evaluation Force, based out of Norfolk, which did an independent -- they work for the chief of Naval Operations, but they did an independent analysis of this, of the airplane, and actually conducted the operational evaluation all the way till July the 15th. So they are manned by fleet experienced test pilots and maintenance personnel and people that come from the fleet and understand the development of aircraft. And they came on board and said the operational -- the airplane is operationally suitable.
That was their finding. And how did they do that? They flew the airplane, they worked with it. They're the ones that came up with the exact same numbers that Mr.Coyle's office used to develop his Beyond LRIP [low rate initial production] report. That's where he got his numbers. But they, being operators and understanding how an airplane develops and matures from both a mechanical perspective, a supply support perspective, and an employment perspective, they understand where the airplane's going in the future. And they're very confident, and thus they said the airplane was operationally suitable.
Mr. Coyle's office, representing the civilian side of the evaluation, said that the airplane is operationally effective and there's no question about it. It flew farther than it was supposed to. It lifted more than it was supposed to. It is a very, very capable airplane. He took the Marine Corps to task on the issue of maintainability and reliability, and frankly, we're pleased that he did because when that airplane went through the operational evaluation, the early part, you should know that it entered OPEVAL [operational evaluation] with one airframe; the first production airplane. And then as the OPEVAL continued, we brought in three more airplanes. So, during that period of time, let's just take a glimpse -- you know, a glimpse of the very first part of the operational evaluation -- if that airplane broke for any reason, there was no other airplane. I mean, there was nothing else to continue the operational evaluation on. So as we went into this with a frankly, a less-than-mature supply support system, and we didn't have it, there was not a robust supply locker resident at New River and Patuxent River when we went through the operational evaluation. So we didn't try to pre-load this thing. So the airplane went through with a less-than-mature supply support system, and it began to show. And we had problems with some new technology.
Mr. Bacon talked about the fasteners. The airplane is predominantly carbon fiber. There are a variety of things -- cables, wires, wire bundles -- just like an airliner that you'd fly in commercially --that have to be fastened in the airplane. This is very simplistic. But how do you take a fastener that's going to hold a wire bundle that weighs a hundred pounds and fasten it to a fiber -- a carbon fiber airframe that can withstand the vibrations and all the other things that you can imagine in a military airplane? It's done by glue. Well, there is a variety of different kinds of glue and we found out the hard way, as we began to look at fasteners on this airplane, what was wrong with the way we had the fasteners and the glue being applied. That was a significant maintainability and reliability issue as we went through operational evaluation. We have corrected that problem right now.
Mr. Bacon talked about 118 fixes that the program manager has already put in the airframe to fix issues that came up during the operational evaluation. I don't think it's unrealistic to think that an airframe that's entering it's service -- and by the way, we have nine airplanes now; our first nine airplanes at New River and VMMT-204, which is our training squadron -- we've only got nine. And of those nine, the first four that entered the squadron were the ones who went through operation evaluation.
It's not unrealistic to think that you're going to have developmental changes to the airframe. The blade-fold wing-stow mechanism, which allows the blades to collapse into one unit and then causes the entire wing to turn 90 degrees so that we can fit this thing aboard a ship, just like the wings fold on an F-18 or an F-14, it's not unrealistic to think that they're going to have problems in something that is mechanically as tightly engineered as that is. That's been fixed. Mr. Coyle himself flew out to the ship, at the very beginning of November, and witnessed that, and actually flew on an Osprey and then gave it a thumbs up. So those are issues on maintainability and reliability mechanically for the airframe that needed to be fixed, and they have been fixed.
Now, have they all been fixed? I mean, are there other things that are out there? Sure there are. And again, it's not unrealistic to think that we're not going to mature the system. The program manager is dedicated to fixing all those things. Folks, it takes money, and we're working diligently on it right now to repair the airplane, or get the repair pieces of that airplane up so it's maintainable and reliable.
Let me throw a figure out to you. Those nine airplanes that I talked about out in 204 down in New River, I pulled -- as I was walking down here, I pulled the first 13 days of November, mission-capable rate on those airplanes, and the average is 73.2 percent for the first 13 days in November of those nine airplanes. So when we start talking about is the airplane, even since OPEVAL, improving and getting better, the answer is it is absolutely a resounding yes. Yes, ma'am?
Q: A couple of questions. What was the mission-capable rate prior to this, so that we have some level of comparison. And how long -- could you explain to us the difference between operationally suitable and operationally effective?
Amos: Yes.
Q: And how long will it take until you are operationally suitable?
Amos: Okay. Let me go to your first question. If you didn't hear it, it was what was the mission-capable rate, and I assuming we'll talk about operation evaluation, since that's the criteria we're using, and that's the number of airplanes that are up. An airplane -- it was 57percent mission capable during operation evaluation for that period of time that the airplane was examined. Now, that's lower than we want, but that's not lower than it is right now, and that's not lower than it's going to go in the future. But that gives you a frame of reference: 57 percent when it came through operation evaluation; it's73 percent as of midway through November.
The second question was --
Q: The second question. What's the definitional difference between suitability and --
Amos: Okay, the operational suitability and operational effectiveness. Effectiveness measures the airplane's ability to perform the specific missions and taskings that it was designed to do. For instance, it has to be able to lift greater than 10,000 pounds. It has to be able to fly un-refueled a specific distance. It has to be able to hover out of ground effect with a certain weight. Those are all the key performance parameters that we look at operationally.
When the operational requirements document was signed on this airplane, those are all the thing that we looked at and said, okay, we want this airplane to do this out in the year 2020 and 2010 and 2015. And it was operationally effective and more than met all those.
Operationally suitable takes into account all the other things, maintainability, reliability. How is the airplane performing from the maintainability side of the house? Is it suitable? And it turns out to be kind of a net cost for the airplane. They don't attach a dollar amount, but it's what's the labor that's going to be required to keep this airplane flying.
Q: And is the V-22 high maintenance at this point?
Amos: Oh, I think the V-22 probably is high maintenance at this point. I think -- but make sure you understand one thing. Any new airframe at this point or any new system is going to be high maintenance. And why would that be? Because first of all, there is the real lack of experience in maintaining this. That airframe -- those Marines that worked on those MV-22s when we went through operational evaluation saw it for the very first time. We didn't have MV-22s out there. They didn't have the capability -- you know, it continues to be referred or balanced against the CH-46. The CH-46 has been flying for 32 years. Do you think we've got experience on maintaining the CH-46? We sure do. We know exactly what is required. So, yeah, it's --
Q: Will the V-22 always be high maintenance because it's --
Amos: Absolutely not. Absolutely not. And I guess that's probably where I have the rub with the implications of the Beyond LRIP report. You get the impression -- it's implied that this is high maintenance and it's going to continue to be that way. And I think that's absolutely unrealistic. It will improve, as it's already improved markedly, from 57 percent mission capable, which means high maintenance, to 73 percent, just for the first 13 days of this month. hat means less than high maintenance.
Q: I'm sorry, sir. With that remarkable increase, did the Marine Corps go to any extraordinary measures? There have been times in the military's history when it's trying to prove a plane -- the B-1springs to mind, where the Air Force has focused all of this efforts on boosting the RM&A on that. Did you do that with the V-22, or is this just a natural improvement?
Amos: No, I think this is a natural improvement being done by the program office -- absolutely. Everything we're doing right now is --and it needs to be done. You know, let me assure you of one thing: the Marine Corps wants the airplane to be low maintenance and high reliability, and we're driving the program office to make that happen.
Q: The report also focuses on another possible -- potential problem with the V-22, and that is the susceptibility to vortex ring state, which was cited as a casual factor in the accident. Is there any indication that this aircraft is more susceptible to that aerodynamic phenomenon than any -- because of its unique technology? Is there a concern about whether this is less forgiving when it comes to that kind of a stall, because of the conditions under which it is flown?
Amos: No, there's absolutely -- there is no concern that the airplane is more unforgiving in that environment. Every helicopter has the potential to experience that. I just flew the CH- 46 last week, and in the briefing we talked about power settling, vortex ring state in theCH-46. So no, it's not any more susceptible. I will tell you that Lieutenant General McCorkle, who I think everybody in this room knows, who is a deputy commandant for Marine Aviation, has required NAVAIR[Naval Air Systems Command] to put a warning device in the cockpit that warns the pilot that he's approaching a regime that could be potentially -- where he could be potentially susceptible to a vortex-ring state. But it's a phenomena for all helicopters.
Q: Have you adjusted the parameters or the limits under which the plane is supposed to be flown in order to lessen the chance of that happening again?
Amos: The Beyond LRIP report, specifically stated by the test pilots that said that flying the airplane outside the parameters that might possibly get you into a vortex ring state absolutely had nil effect on the operational capability of the airplane. So my answer to that question is, is that we fly the airplane the way we need to fly it, and we just avoid that piece of the envelope. I'm a pilot by trade. Every -- I'm a Hornet pilot by trade. Even the F-18,as good as it is, has regions of the envelope that we're required to avoid. So it's not unlike any other airplane.
Q: Sir, in fairness, the report -- Coyle also says he didn't agree that it was nil. And he went on to explain that the plane -- even if the pilot varied from the NATOPS [Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization] rewrite, could inadvertently enter a state, the ring vortex danger zone, as he put it, causing problems. And he agreed with the Navy's and the Marine's approach to keep aggressively testing. But did he not lay out a valid caveat there, that inadvertently a pilot could get in there and not realize he or she was in that ring vortex state?
Amos: Well, I think that there's always the possibility, by virtue of the fact that it's a human being at the controls. Again, I go back to my own experience in the airplanes that I fly. I can always potentially fly them outside the envelope. And just like the F-18 has warning devices in it to remind me when I'm intensely preoccupied in the cockpit with mission, whatever, that tells me that, "Hey, you're nearing stall" or "you're nearing a high angle of attack in this airplane" -- exactly the same kind of concept with this airplane.
The interesting thing is that we have at Patuxent River, Maryland, in my mind, and certainly in the Navy and Marine Corps's mind, the finest aeronautical engineers and test pilots, I think, that are resident in America today. And resoundingly they came out in support of the fact that we've identified the airplane's parameters when it approaches a vortex ring state. We are confident that we can adjust -- not adjust; we're confident that we can identify those regions to the pilots, and just like any other airplane, we can avoid them. So it -- you know, with -- the Beyond LRIP report speaks a lot about vortex ring state. I don't think it's a problem in this airplane, and neither does Patuxent River test pilots.
Q: Let me just ask you about one other part of -- aspect of that. That is, it was noted that in the V-22 you could have this phenomenon of power settling develop under one rotor but not the other --
Amos: Yes.
Q: -- causing the -- to pitch or yaw --
Amos: Yaw.
Q: -- which is what happened in the accident. Isn't that different from what you would experience in a helicopter, and doesn't in that some sense make this a little less forgiving, a little harder for the pilots to realize what's happening and recover from it?
Amos: It will not be harder for him to recover from it, because he'll never enter it as long as he flies the airplane within the parameters established by the testing program, which is exactly, again, like every other airplane that we have.
Q: Let me ask -- when we last saw General McCorkle on this topic a few months ago, and he was asked about warning devices -- and at that point he was -- he thought that was not a practical solution. He said, you know, you can't have a warning device going off for every damn thing the plane is doing, and you'd constantly be ignoring them. They'd be going off. And he just didn't think it was practical. What has changed for him to now require that device? And has there been a technological fix or what?
Amos: That was several months ago, and what's taken place since then is, at General McCorkle's request, Patuxent River test pilots have continued -- and we're about 50 percent through the follow-on, what they call high rate of descent testing. And so we've got test pilots, both in the air and in the simulators, continuing the high rate of descent testing to ensure that we absolutely capture the parameters of this phenomenon in this particular airframe. And as a result of that testing, we've just -- he's come to the conclusion that, why not? We have a ground proximity warning system we put in the F-18. It's a software-induced -- there are lines of code in the software, and it gives you an oral warning that you are approaching the ground. We have it in that airplane, why not put it in this airplane? Why not put an oral warning in this airplane, or some type of warning device? It would be foolish to not do that. And that's the conclusion he's come to.
Q: It's based on just rate of descent?
Amos: It's based on rate of descent and forward velocity which is, by the way, exactly what was in the NATOPS manual before the mishap.
Q: To use your own word, you have a "rub" with this report. I think that's the word that you used. Did the Marines get a chance to make their objections to the report known to Coyle before he put it out? It seems a bit unusual for you guys to be so publicly taking on an OSD report with so many public objections.
Amos: Actually, I don't think I used the term, "I have a rub with this report." Did I?
Q: You did, actually.
Amos: Yeah, I don't -- in fact I think I -- at the very beginning I talked about two evaluations; one primarily military operational test experience, and one civilian, which -- and we need both of them to give us the balanced perspective on it -- on entering a new airframe in there.
Q: Okay, I think you used the word "rub" in addressing the notion that the report didn't adequately talk about the fact that the maintenance costs would come down over time.
Amos: And I think -- okay, and I do think that it's unrealistic tot hink that the maintenance cost of this airplane is not going to comedown over time. The airplane entered our service -- entered our first squadron -- in July. I mean, this is November. I mean, it's -- and that's why I say I think it's unrealistic to think at this point, for this snapshot in time, that this airplane is not going to improve in maintainability and reliability when, in fact, it already has.
Q: But did the Marines get a chance to make their differences of opinion known before the report came out?
Amos: We talked all the way through. We have a very good communications setup between OPTEVFOR and the DOT&E [Director Operational Test and Evaluation] folks. And we've been talking all the way along -- absolutely.
Q: What of the --Q: One more budget question: This would be an interesting intellectual discussion about a weapons system under early development if it wasn't for the fact that next Tuesday the Marines or the Navy are going to dictate possibly sending this into full-rate production, a potential $30 billion decision. At the end of an administration and at the eve of an incoming one, why not keep this thing in low-rate production for another year while the bugs are worked out and you can give the public and the military a little bit more confidence that the plane is, in fact, improving? Why the need for a Milestone 3 decision at this point in the program?
Amos: I'm probably not the guy to be able to answer that question, but I can give you a glimpse on what full-rate production right now means, just so you have a perspective. Full-rate production is we look over the planned budget over the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program] is 16airplanes in fiscal year '02. That's not a lot of airplanes. You know, again, we've delivered nine airplanes this year. So that is --full-rate production sounds like we're going to throw out 100 airplanes a year, and that's simply not the case. We're talking 16airplanes in FY '02.
Q: You would agree, though, it's a symbolic major step in a program that normally is irreparable -- irrevocable -- excuse me -- can't be turned off. You don't go back from Milestone 3.
Amos: That's right.
Q: That's the goal of all the services, to get --
Amos: Absolutely.
Q: -- the thing to Milestone 3, basically to protect the investment in the program. And I'm just asking, what would be the problem of going a year delay in that, because you can't answer this -- you know --
Amos: Well, I tell you, I can only answer from my perspective, and that's the airplane, from my, and from Marine aviation's perspective, is operationally suitable and operationally -- it's a program that can be executed. It's a suitable airframe that will grow in maturity. And we're very comfortable with that. And because of that, I have no problems with the thing going in full-rate production. None whatsoever.
Q: The taxpayers might, or other -- you know, members of Congress who monitor OSD expenditures, and the building might -- the Marines, of course, wouldn't care. They want the thing go to Milestone 3. It's a fiscal responsibility issue, I would think.
Amos: Next question.
Q: A layman reading this report, maybe just reading the -- a cursory review of this report, and maybe remembering the accident in April might conclude that the V-22 is somehow a troubled program. What would you say to someone who had that impression?
Amos: I don't agree that the V-22 is a troubled program. I think theV-22 is a maturing program right now. And I think it's probably, realistically, where it should be in its maturity. And I'd like to be able to come back in a year from now and be able to answer that question because I think you would be very satisfied with the answer that I gave you a year from now. Sir?
Q: If this is a high-maintenance aircraft, is there a greater risk in flying it? And at what point do you use it to move troops around and that sort of thing?
Amos: We're using it -- we move troops around on it right now. It is--
Q: Is it safe --
Amos: I'm having just a little bit of trouble with the consistent reference to it's a high maintainability airplane. It is an airplane that is under -- that is being introduced to the fleet for the very first time. It is moving troops. I was down at New River two weeks ago -- just to give you a vignette, a snapshot of what's going on at the squadron, there were six airplanes sitting on the flight line. Five of them were up; they were flying the airplanes consistently throughout the day. Only one of the airplanes out of five were down. There were two that were in the hangar for scheduled incorporation of airframes changes, part of these118 airframes changes and changes that we put in there as a result of maintainability and reliability. The airplanes are continuing to fly at New River.
Q: Is it safe? Is it riskier to fly because of the maintenance?
Amos: It absolutely is not. Sir?
Q: I'm just trying to understand why over time -- I think Ken mentioned learning curve. Are you saying that the number of man hours to maintain these planes and keep them flying is now a certain level, and it will go down once you figure out the best way to do things, or once you figure out the real maintenance parameters that you need to do, once you have more experience with it? Is that why it will go down?
Amos: There are two reasons it will go down. One is the experience of the maintainers. And again, remember when they went to Operational Evaluation, the Marines that maintain those airplanes saw that airplane for the very first time. Where did they come from? They came from representative squadrons throughout the Marine Corps -- C-130s,CH-46s, H-53 squadrons. So their experience level has changed just since it entered Operation Evaluation. And a portion of those Marines have come to New River and Joined VMMT-204. So they are part of the reason why the maintainability of the airplane will increase, and the cost of maintaining the airplane will decrease.
The other piece of this thing is the quality assurance, just the changes that are being put into parts of the airplane -- the fasteners, the blade-fold wing (inaudible) -- the things that -- the (inaudible) plates on the airplane -- all those things that come from industry that only through flying an airplane and maintaining it in the fleet will you understand and learn just exactly what the nuances of that piece of -- specific piece of equipment are. We learn that. It's not unlike -- probably not unlike my '72Volkswagen that I bought brand new and I still have today. I can sure maintain that a lot easier today than I could when I first got it.
Q: General, just before you -- could we ask what your job is in connection with the plane?
Amos: I am Lt. Gen. McCorkle's deputy -- the assistant deputy commandant of Marine Aviation.
Q: Your first name, sir.
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