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Gen. Shelton Testifies on Readiness of U.S. Armed Forces
Tells SASC U.S. Troops Are Capable But Need More Resources |
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(Source : US State Department ; issued Sept. 27, 2000)
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton, told
Congress September 27 that the U.S. military is capable of executing
the National Military Strategy but that the risks involved in taking
part in major conflicts have increased.
Shelton and the chiefs of the Marine Corps, the Air Force and the
Army, testified on military readiness before the Senate Armed Services
Committee. The House Armed Services Committee heard similar testimony
later in the day.
The measure of readiness" continues to be the ability to fight and
win two simultaneous major theater wars (MTW). However, the risk
associated with this "most demanding scenario has increased over the
past several years," Shelton said. The risk involved in the execution
of the first MTW would be moderate, he added, and that for the second
MTW would be high.
Shelton said that efforts made by the armed forces to address
deficiencies in areas such as manning, training, and equipment
readiness, as well as funding increases in the FY 1999 and 2000
budgets "have arrested the declines in most cases."
In short, he and the other chiefs testified, while short-term
readiness has improved, "those results have come at the expense of
(the United States') ability to provide resources for maintaining
infrastructure."
In order to prepare for future challenges, the services will require
additional resources, Shelton said. This will entail "additional
funding from the administration and the congress if we are to
simultaneously improve our current readiness, recapitalize our heavily
used equipment and our aging infrastructure and modernize the force."
Following is the text of his testimony, as prepared for delivery:
STATEMENT OF GENERAL HENRY H. SHELTON
Chairman Of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff
Before The 106th Congress Committee On Armed Services
United States Senate
(27 September 2000)
Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I am pleased to
provide this written statement with my views on the readiness of
America's Armed Forces and their ability to execute our national
military strategy.
First, I would like to acknowledge and thank the Congress for its
sustained and significant support to the men and women in our Armed
Forces. We have made considerable progress these past two years in
several key areas: increasing pay and allowances for the force;
beginning the effort to reform TRICARE; initiating a new effort to
provide adequate military housing; and, most importantly, arresting
the decline in near-term readiness. I would like to commend this
Committee, in particular, for your leadership role in this ongoing
effort to support our men and women in uniform.
And let me join the Committee in paying tribute to our military
members in the Active Force, the Guard and Reserves -- many of whom
are deployed away from their homes maintaining the peace, and
upholding America's interests around the world.
Since I last appeared before the SASC in May of this year, I have had
the opportunity to visit U.S. forces throughout the United States,
Europe, Southwest Asia and, just last week, in South Korea and the
Balkans. Wherever I went, I saw the same things: courage, spirit, and
determination. In my 37 years in uniform, I have never been around
better soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. They are our most
valuable resource and they represent the United States at its very
best.
In the invitation to testify before the SASC, Senators Warner and
Levin asked the Service Chiefs and me to provide our assessment of the
readiness of our Armed Forces to meet our national security
challenges.
The starting point for any such assessment must be our ability to
execute the National Military Strategy, including the most demanding
scenario -- fighting and winning nearly two simultaneous major
theater wars.
As I have testified before this Committee from almost the start of my
tenure as Chairman, and as the Department reported to the Congress in
the last Quarterly Readiness Report, our review of overall force
readiness indicates that forward deployed and "first-to-fight" forces
remain capable of executing the National Military Strategy. But, as I
have consistently testified, the risk associated with the most
demanding scenario has increased over the past several years.
Specifically, we continue to assess the risk factors associated with
execution of the 1st MTW as moderate and for the 2nd MTW as high.
This does not mean that U.S. forces would not prevail in either
contingency. What it does mean is that it would take us longer to
respond to hostilities. In turn, this can mean territory lost and the
potential for a longer fight with increased casualties.
This risk assessment for the 2-MTW scenario is based on many factors,
including both traditional readiness issues voiced by the Services,
and joint readiness issues reported by the Commanders in Chief
(CINCs).
As the SASC well knows, the Services have reported declining readiness
indicators in areas such as manning, training, and equipment readiness
for several years, although not all Services have experienced problems
to the same extent. While the readiness deficiencies are most visible
in the later deploying and non-deploying forces, some forward deployed
and "first-to-fight" forces -- though ready -- have also experienced
some of these difficulties. The Services have taken active measures to
address these deficiencies and we are now seeing evidence that those
efforts, in conjunction with the much-needed funding increases in the
FY 1999 and FY 2000 budgets, have arrested the declines in most cases.
In addition, two other areas of concern must be recognized. First,
while our materiel is ready for combat operations, our long-term
ability to sustain that equipment is slipping. One cause is due to the
negative effects of a higher than planned tempo of operations on our
aging equipment. This high tempo and the associated wear-and-tear
require more frequent maintenance and repair, further highlighting the
need for recapitalization and modernization of our forces. Moreover,
we have not been able to procure enough new equipment to reduce the
average age of our force structure. It is also important to note that
we believe this higher maintenance tempo has also had a deleterious
effect on the hardworking troops attempting to maintain this aging
equipment, which directly impacts retention of our quality force.
Second, while the focus on current readiness issues is necessary and
has produced positive results, those results have come at the expense
of our ability to provide resources for maintaining infrastructure.
The Services will continue their efforts to balance resources to meet
the competing demands of personnel, current readiness, and
infrastructure. However, continuing to improve our current readiness
posture to desired levels while preparing for tomorrow's challenges
will require additional resources. Some of the required resources may
be derived from additional Base Realignment and Closure rounds.
Our latest Quarterly Readiness Report submitted to Congress also
highlighted the "joint readiness" concerns of the CINCs regarding
their ability to synchronize and utilize forces to meet theater and
national objectives. These concerns generally reflect capability
deficiencies that highlight shortages of specific types or quantities
of systems or the need for additional personnel billets, as opposed to
traditional readiness issues that are managed by the Services.
The report emphasized eight areas of strategic concern:
command, control, communications and computer (C4) deficiencies;
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) deficiencies; mobility
shortfalls; logistics/sustainment shortfalls; terrorist and weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) challenges; information vulnerabilities;
stresses on the force from ongoing contingency operations; and the
ability to disengage quickly from ongoing operations to meet timelines
for a 2-MTW scenario.
Many of these deficiencies are being addressed through the Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process and there are ongoing
programmatic efforts in place to correct them. Specific deficiencies
and efforts to resolve them are classified in nature and are discussed
in some detail in the classified portion of our Quarterly Readiness
Report to Congress.
In summary, while we have the most capable force in the world, we will
need additional funding from the Administration and the Congress if we
are to simultaneously improve our current readiness, recapitalize our
heavily used equipment and our aging infrastructure and modernize the
force so that when we place our men and women in uniform in harm's way
they continue to have substantial technological advantages. The exact
requirement for additional funding will be predicated on the coming
Quadrennial Defense Review which will address future force structure.
Regardless, we must continue to maintain our focus on maintaining our
quality force, which is our most decisive edge, by providing the
quality of life which they and their families deserve.
The Service Chiefs and I appreciate the opportunity to meet with the
SASC and to share our views.
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