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European Security And Defence
Speech by Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean
UK Minister of State for Defence Procurement
London, June 19, 2000 |
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(Source : UK Ministry of Defence ; issued June 26, 2000)
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For more than fifty years we have built our security around NATO, the very foundations of which were laid by the British and American staffs planning Operation Overlord, and in no small part by the relationships developed through the British American Forces Dining Club. It therefore seems appropriate that I should talk about the work we are doing to build up Europe’s responsibilities in the field of security and defence.
There has been much speculation that Europe is building its own Army. That Europe plans to split from NATO. That we are moving away from the Americans. Over the next 15 minutes or so, I hope to set the record straight.
Over the last decade, Europeans have faced many crisis situations that ultimately required the involvement of military forces. With one or two exceptions, we acted using the forces we had planned and trained during the Cold War. But the challenges we face today are different: more uncertain and of smaller scale, but no less real.
No longer must we think only about opponents who will face us in conventional conflicts. We must tackle a plethora of novel and irregular threats and challenges. To operate effectively in this new strategic environment requires forces that are readily and rapidly deployable to crisis areas, flexible enough to carry out a diverse range of crisis management tasks, and sustainable in theatre, often with limited support from the local infrastructure, until their job is done.
Nothing showed this more clearly that events in Kosovo. European nations, collectively, could field quickly only a tiny percentage of the total forces available to them, in order to deal with a problem in their own backyard. Britain certainly played its part, and Europeans have subsequently taken on the leading role in Kosovo, but it was American muscle that ultimately ensured success. We have never suggested that Kosovo was solely a European problem, but it shone a particularly fierce light on European shortfalls.
Collectively, the European Allies and European Union Member States spend some $190 billion on defence every year, compared to the United States’ expenditure of about $270 billion. So the problem is not simply that we do not spend enough on defence. But whilst Europeans spend two-thirds of that spent by the US, we do not get two-thirds of the US’s capability in return. It is clear that we need to think seriously about how Europe spends its defence budgets.
European nations have around two million men and women in uniform. So the problem is not simply that we do not have enough troops. But there is a pressing need to look at the way in which many of Europe’s armed forces are organised and trained, and to move away from large conscript armies towards readily deployable professional forces. We must ensure that these developments continue in parallel with equipment improvements if we are to keep pace with the changing face of crisis management operations. Europe is otherwise in danger of being ready for the last war, rather than the next.
It was against this backdrop that the Prime Minister renewed the debate on European security and defence at the end of 1998. He argued that it was time for the EU to assume a place on the international stage that matched its size and economic weight. So that the EU’s more traditional responses to crises diplomatic, economic and humanitarian measures could be underpinned as necessary by military measures. For too long Europe has been unable to shoulder enough of its own security burden.
Since then, we have seen a succession of rapidly evolving ideas. In particular, EU leaders made a commitment to improving their military effectiveness at the Helsinki Summit last year, by agreeing a Headline Goal for military capability. This states that, by 2003, EU nations should be able to assemble up to 60,000 personnel to undertake crisis management operations. They should be trained and ready to reach crisis spots quickly, and be prepared to stay there for up to a year. This could form part of a NATO-led operation or, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, the EU could lead a crisis management mission.
In 2000, we need to begin to deliver. The European Summit taking place in Feira today and tomorrow will mark the end of the Portuguese Presidency of the EU. It will report the considerable progress we have made over the last six months on improving capabilities. We have succeeded in developing the concept of the Headline Goal, and have agreed the need to define the precise pool of forces a bit like a football, or should I say soccer, squad that will be required to deliver what we’ve signed up to.
We have also agreed that the EU will draw on NATO expertise to assist with this task, which will ensure that we minimise duplication and maximise transparency and co-operation between the two organisations. On current planning, we expect EU countries to nominate their contributions" to the Headline Goal at a conference in November. We will then need to develop and approve the necessary steps to address any shortfalls that are found to exist.
NATO plays the central role in our plans for European defence. I should stress that there is absolutely no contradiction between our objectives for European defence and our continuing support of the Atlantic Alliance. What we are doing is tying future European crisis management firmly into the framework of the Alliance. There is no disagreement among the Allies NATO is and will remain the cornerstone of our security and defence policy. For meaningful large scale military operations, NATO is the only show in town. NATO will be the sole organisation for collective defence in Europe. And NATO will be the organisation that we expect to turn to for significant crisis management operations, and certainly when Europeans and North Americans wish to act together, as we have in the Balkans. We are not aiming to build a competitor to NATO, nor are we prepared to take any action that might damage or undermine the Alliance.
We are also taking forward in parallel the work that needs to be done within the Alliance. After all, the term European Security and Defence Identity originated in NATO, even if it has since become synonymous with the wider debate on European defence. The aims of the headline goal process match closely those of NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative the DCI. The UK is a strong supporter of the DCI which, although a NATO-wide initiative, is primarily aimed at improving European Allies’ capabilities in five key areas: deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, effective engagement, command and control, and survivability. In other words, exactly the sort of capabilities that Europe will require for crisis management missions. So it is clear that there is no divergence between what Europe and NATO are trying to achieve. Indeed, if we are to succeed in our aim of strengthening the European pillar of NATO, and thus strengthen NATO as a whole, we must ensure that the DCI and the headline goal are mutually reinforcing.
The approach that I have described drawing on NATO capabilities to support developments in the EU reflects our wider approach to European defence. It is simply not sensible, practical, or affordable to duplicate NATO structures, assets or capabilities in some form of European “Mini NATOâ€. So we have advocated an approach whereby the EU should build a minimum capability to take decisions with military implications, while the bulk of military capacities to implement these decisions planning, command structures, and other key assets would be drawn from resources available to NATO. Provided that the European Union can be confident of its access to the Alliance’s assets and capabilities, it can develop its responsibilities for security and defence in a way that does not duplicate NATO.
This approach has been widely accepted and was given substance at NATO’s Washington Summit, where NATO supported the EU’s aspirations and announced that it stood ready to develop arrangements to provide the EU with ready access to its resources. Under this package of measures, NATO will allow the EU assured access to its planning capacities, and a presumption of availability of its common assets and capabilities for use in EU-led operations. In other words, the EU will have access by right to NATO planning capacities, and access to other assets and capabilities unless there are good reasons otherwise.
Of course, real capability improvements don’t happen overnight, but we are making a good start. In Britain, we are already changing the way our armed forces operate as a result of the Strategic Defence Review. We have set up a new Joint Rapid Reaction Force and a Joint Helicopter Force, to name but two examples, which combine people from all three Services. British forces remain ready to react rapidly to crisis anywhere in the world. The way we responded to the situation in Sierra Leone is a good example of how quickly we are able to mobilise, and our recently announced new orders for transport aircraft and missiles will further improve our capabilities.
We are not talking about building a European Army. National forces will remain exactly that, just as they are in NATO. Individual countries, not the European Commission, will decide whether, when and how to commit their forces. And national governments will continue to be answerable to national parliaments, not the European Parliament, for the use of their forces.
Some co-ordination and collective decision-making arrangements are, however, needed between governments. These need to be serious and well organised, but they will not be large bureaucracies. They need to work with the other aspects of EU crisis management, with NATO and with countries outside the EU but which have closely linked security interests, in particular the other European members of NATO Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. To this end, we expect the EU Heads of State and Government to endorse proposals at Feira that will lead to a close and practical EU/NATO partnership. A British general is leading work on developing the EU’s military arrangements. It is not easy to generate new arrangements like this in the crowded landscape of international institutions. But remarkable progress is being made.
We are looking to establish workable EU and EU/NATO crisis management structures by January 2001, so we face an ambitious timetable for the remainder of the year. There is a great deal to be done on a practical level to implement and interpret the larger design already sketched out.
We now need to make sure that all European nations are able to meet the challenges of the new security landscape. That is what the European defence initiative means in practice. We are proud to be playing a leading role in this exciting process of change
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