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Russia Is Key To Managing
National Missile Defense Diplomacy |
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(Source : US State Department ; issued March 23, 2000)
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President Clinton's senior adviser on arms control says that the key
to managing the diplomacy of NMD (National Missile Defense)
deployment is Russia."
Not only is Russia the other signatory of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty, but it still has many thousands of nuclear
warheads, according to former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Director John Holum.
Holum told an audience at Stanford University on March 3 that Russia's
approach to U.S. efforts to adapt to the ABM Treaty "will have a
significant impact on the reactions of other states." While the United
States must recognize "that Moscow has legitimate fears about any NMD
deployment," he also said the Russians must be ready to negotiate on
adaptation "in good faith."
In a speech designed to explain President Clinton's NMD Decision this
summer on whether or not to proceed with NMD, and to describe some of
the international reaction to proposed U.S. national and theater
missile defenses, the senior State Department official said the U.S.
is laying "the groundwork for reaching agreement, if, and when, the
Russians make a political decision to negotiate Treaty changes." U.S.
officials are seeking to address Russian concerns on NMD and ABM
Treaty adaptation "through invigorated U.S.-Russian cooperation on
measures related to the ABM Treaty, as well as missile defense," Holum
said.
Since both the United States and Russia face threats from ballistic
missiles, he said, cooperative programs between the two "should reap
tangible security benefits." Right now, he said, the U.S. is still
assessing how recent Russian leadership changes, including the Duma
elections, "might affect the ABM/NMD negotiations."
Holum also emphasized the importance of Europe to NMD diplomacy.
Allied concerns must be addressed effectively, he said. U.S.
officials, he said, believe that missile defense programs, including a
limited NMD, can enhance the ability of the United States "to fulfill
its NATO and global security commitments."
Finally, Holum said he has worked hard to establish a regular
strategic dialogue with the Chinese on the subject of missile defense
in an effort to allay their concerns. Part of the problem, he said, is
trying to overcome the low information level the Chinese have about
NMD.
Just as deterrence works in the context of the U.S.-Russian
relationship, so too, does it with the U.S. and China, he said. The
United States does not consider China "to be a rogue state," Holum
said, nor does it envision any future that would involve American NMD
protection being used against China.
"We need to manage our dialogue with China so they will not view a
U.S. decision to deploy a limited NMD as evidence of hostility or an
effort to undermine their security," he added. Additionally, he said,
"We don't want NMD to give China incentives to go beyond the ongoing
strategic modernization program they had planned before NMD became an
issue."
In concluding his remarks, Holum said the United States believes that
NMD "can be carried out in conformance with the core purpose of the
ABM Treaty, with further strategic reductions, with a stable strategic
environment, and with continued progress against proliferation."
Following is the text of Holum's remarks as delivered:
I'm delighted to have this opportunity to step outside the Washington
beltway and talk about national missile defense (NMD) and its impact
in a broader international context. On an issue of this significance,
it's not only important, but imperative, for us in Washington to avoid
"group-think" and to expose ourselves to the thinking in the outside
world. You come at this issue from a wide range of backgrounds and
perspectives, and I trust our exchange will be enlightening for us
all.
I've also prepared for this conference by conducting another round of
meetings on NMD, the ABM Treaty and START III with Yuri Kapralov and
his Russian team earlier this week in Geneva. Those meetings always
provide a healthy dose of reality. The best description I can offer is
that on ABM amendments we persist in interpreting the Russian "nyet"
as a contraction of "not yet," while they, with force and persistence,
tell us we couldn't be more wrong.
The Fourth Criterion
The administration takes the foreign policy implications of a possible
NMD deployment decision very seriously. You are all familiar with the
four criteria the President will consider, especially the first three
- the threat, technology, and cost. Today I want to focus specifically
on the fourth one, which has not been as fully examined.
Since the fourth criterion was first articulated we have become
increasingly mindful not only of direct arms control considerations,
but of the broad international dimension of an NMD deployment
decision. The December 1999 White House document "A National Security
Strategy for a New Century" articulates the fourth criterion as "the
implications that going forward with NMD deployment would hold for the
overall strategic environment and our arms control objectives."
In a meeting with members of the Senate a couple of weeks ago, (Deputy
Secretary of State) Strobe Talbott and I were challenged on why the
U.S. is even considering the views of Russia and other countries as
part of our NMD deployment decision. I would not have thought to look
to the Founding Fathers to help frame a response, but as they did on
so many other issues, they captured the essence of the argument
beautifully. Ironically, it is found in Federalist Paper number 63,
which justified the Senate's creation.
The author, probably Hamilton or Madison, argues that, without a more
stable body of government, the esteem of foreign powers could be
forfeited by unenlightened and variable policy, and that only the
Senate would possess a sensibility to world opinion and merit
international respect and confidence. Then the author explained why
attention to the opinion of other nations is important, in these
words:
"An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every
government for two reasons: the one is, that, independently of the
merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various
accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a
wise and honorable policy; the second is, that in doubtful cases,
particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong
passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the
impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed."
Secretary Albright will be very focused on the fourth criterion when
she provides her input into the President's deployment decision this
summer. Under this criterion she will consider at least six elements
-- the impact of NMD deployment on our arms control objectives, our
non-proliferation objectives, and our relations with European allies,
with Pacific allies, with Russia, and with China. These are the
elements I want to focus on tonight.
In particular, I want to talk about how we are taking the views of
Russia, our friends and allies, and China, into account and, at the
same time, seeking to shape their reactions to NMD. We aren't just
being good listeners; we want a dialogue. We want to persuade others
that a deployment decision would be the "offspring of a wise and
honorable policy," and we need to have our views challenged to
convince ourselves that the President's decision will not be based on
"some strong passion or momentary interest."
Such a dialogue imposes a heavy burden on the United States to clearly
articulate the purpose of proceeding with NMD, including our view of
the threat; the details of our NMD program; and how we see it fitting
into a larger worldview, including its impact on the current arms
control and non-proliferation regimes, and strategic stability more
broadly.
But a constructive dialogue also places burdens on other countries.
They must move beyond their natural resistance to any disruption to
the status quo and be prepared to face up to changes in the strategic
environment. They must get past a tendency to "worst-case" the impact
of any adaptation of the ABM Treaty, or assume that any change
represents a "slippery-slope" leading inevitably to the Treaty's
destruction.
In short, our friends and allies, Russia and China, must come to this
dialogue with open minds and be prepared for a rational discussion.
It's not enough to just say "No" in the face of a U.S. need to address
what we believe is a real threat to our security. "No" is not a
dialogue, and no country will ultimately have a veto over NMD
deployment if the President concludes such a system is necessary to
protect the American people.
The Key to Managing NMD Diplomacy is Russia
The key to managing the diplomacy of NMD deployment is Russia. It is
the other Party to the ABM Treaty. It still has many thousands of
nuclear warheads. And Russia's approach to adapting the Treaty will
have a significant impact on the reactions of other states.
Our own approach is cooperative. We want to avoid forcing the
President to a choice between the ABM Treaty and an NMD system that he
decides is necessary to protect the American people. But to avoid
this, the Russians must be prepared to negotiate in good faith. At the
same time, we need to recognize that Moscow has legitimate fears about
any NMD deployment.
As I mentioned, I flew to San Francisco just having completed the
fourth in a series of meetings with my Russian counterparts on START
III and the ABM Treaty. A parallel dialogue is under way between
Deputy Secretary Talbott and DFM (Deputy Foreign Minister) Mamedov.
Secretary Albright is also fully engaged on these questions, and
considerable time was devoted to these issues during her recent talks
in Moscow. We are laying the groundwork for reaching agreement if and
when the Russians make a political decision to negotiate Treaty
changes.
We are addressing Russian concerns in three broad areas. First, we
need to reassure Moscow that in deploying a limited NMD system we are
not seeking to change the core foundation of our nuclear relationship,
that is, that a limited NMD will not threaten Russia's strategic
deterrent.
Accordingly, we are seeking only those Treaty changes that we believe
will be necessary to address threats as we project they will emerge.
We believe this phased approach will maximize our chances of reaching
agreement with Russia on ABMT (ABM Treaty) adaptation, as well as on
START III.
Based on objective analysis, neither our Phase I, nor even Phase II,
architecture would pose a threat to Russia's strategic deterrent.
Russian officials have, in fact, stated repeatedly that they have the
capability to overwhelm any NMD. Late last year, General Yakovlev, the
Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, said that the SS-27, which
will form the backbone of Russia's ICBM (intercontinental ballistic
missile) force under START II and III, "is able to breach any
anti-missile system that exists in the world and any which will be
built in the near future."
I have been struck by the fact that in our discussions, the Russians'
critique of NMD has not focused on the impact of Phase I or Phase II
deployments on their deterrent but, rather, on their concern that such
deployments would establish an infrastructure allowing future
breakout. So one of our negotiating challenges will be to ensure
continuing Russian confidence that a U.S. NMD system remains a limited
one, fielded within the agreed terms of an amended ABM Treaty.
I believe we can accomplish this through confidence-building and
transparency measures -- an approach we used in negotiating the
ABM/TMD (Theater Missile Defense) demarcation agreements -- and
possibly through enhancements to the ABM Treaty's verification regime,
which now relies solely on national technical means. We have been
putting forward some ideas along these lines.
Russia views the capabilities of a limited NMD system in the context
of a surprise, disarming U.S. first-strike. We tend not to understand
that countries -- Russia and China, in particular -- tend to look at
NMD in a larger context; they connect the dots. Thus, it's not totally
surprising that the Russians see a more threatening environment when
they link, for example, NMD with NATO expansion; intervention in
Kosovo without United Nations imprimatur; and a general decline in
Russian military power. While the thought of a bolt-out-of-the-blue
nuclear strike now seems anachronistic to us, it may not seem so to
the Russian military which, after all, is paid to consider the
implications of such dire scenarios.
We have been explaining to our Russian counterparts in considerable
technical detail why, even under a worst-case scenario, NMD would not
threaten Russia's deterrent. But the Strategic Arms Reduction process
can also help address this concern. One of the major accomplishments
of START II -- its ban on MIRVed (multiple independently targeted
re-entry vehicles) ICBMs and, in particular, vulnerable fixed silo
MIRVed ICBMs -- is a large step toward eliminating any strategic
advantage from a first strike. Negotiated in parallel with changes to
the ABM Treaty to permit a limited NMD, a START III agreement would
ensure that as Russian strategic force levels decline, as they will
with or without arms control, U.S. forces will come down as well. In
short, we are not seeking to combine NMD with numerically superior
U.S. offensive forces.
We are also seeking to address Russian concerns through invigorated
U.S.-Russian cooperation on measures related to the ABM Treaty, as
well as missile defense. "Cooperation" describes not only our approach
to negotiating ABM Treaty changes, but also our willingness to engage
the Russians in a significant number of specific activities.
We have put on the table for discussion a wide range of ideas ranging
from expanded discussion of missile threats, including the possibility
of a "joint" intelligence assessment, to the expansion of current
cooperative programs such as the ongoing TMD exercise program and
RAMOS (Russian-American Observation Satellites program for early
warning and theater missile defense research); to an even wider array
of voluntary transparency measures, some of which could be carried out
even before the conclusion of an ABM agreement; to assistance in
restoring the Russian ballistic missile early warning network.
Both the U.S. and Russia face ballistic missile threats. Through
cooperative programs, both should reap tangible security benefits.
This will help both governments demonstrate that a cooperative
approach on ABM is in our common interest, rather than a confrontation
leading to the Treaty's possible demise.
We are still assessing how the change in the Russian leadership, as
well as last December's Duma elections, might affect the ABM/NMD
negotiations. Acting (Russian) President Putin made some encouraging
statements during Secretary Albright's recent visit to Moscow, but it
is not possible to draw any conclusions at this point.
The Russians will ultimately have a calculation to make -- whether it
is better to accept the potential deployment of a limited U.S. NMD
system and continue on the path of strategic arms reductions or,
alternatively, to jeopardize the strategic predictability provided by
the ABM Treaty and the START process at a time when they can least
afford a new arms buildup. They may not make that calculation until
after the Presidential election in March. The good news is that the
acceleration of the election from June to March provides a wider
window for negotiations before President Clinton faces the NMD
deployment decision this summer.
The Europeans
As with the Russians, the key to NMD diplomacy with Europe is
dialogue. Last November when Strobe Talbott offered the first extended
briefing of U.S. thinking to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), our
allies "unloaded" their pent-up feelings on the first available
American target. But I believe we are now well past the emotional
stage in this discussion.
But the allies have concerns that we need effectively to address. We
are institutionalizing in NATO a process for addressing these issues
in the months leading up to the Spring Ministerials and the
President's NMD decision, so he will have the full range of allied
thinking. Meanwhile we will provide the information they need, correct
any misperceptions, and articulate our considerations with respect to
NMD and, in doing so, hopefully adjust their thinking.
Let me briefly address the key concerns our European allies have
raised about our NMD policy.
First, the allies fear NMD will undermine the NATO alliance's
principle of "shared risk" and could ultimately lead to the
"decoupling" of the U.S. from Europe.
To the contrary, we believe missile defenses, including a limited NMD,
can enhance U.S. ability to fulfill its NATO and global security
commitments. Defenses render less credible any rogue state attempts to
use WMD-armed ballistic missiles to deter us from responding to
aggression or otherwise meeting our security commitments. We should
keep in mind, for example, that U.S. intervention in the Gulf War and
in Kosovo faced considerable opposition in both the public and the
Congress. What would the public opinion balance sheet have looked like
if Sadaam (Hussein) or (Slobodan) Milosevic could have threatened to
use WMD-armed missiles against the United States if we intervened? At
the NAC, Deputy Secretary Talbott has posed the question "Why would
the U.S. be a better ally if we were exposed to a missile threat?" We
haven't heard a good answer.
A second concern we hear is that NMD means giving up on deterrence. In
fact, the core of deterrence is the ability to convince a potential
aggressor that the risks far outweigh any potential gains. There are
two parts of this equation. The threat of retaliation drives home that
the negative consequences of aggression would be huge. But deterrence
is also bolstered if we can reduce the chance that an attack would
succeed in the first place. Ballistic missile defense does not
undermine, but complements and reinforces, deterrence.
Third, some of our NATO allies are concerned that we are overstating
the threat. This concern, I think, flows from outdated Cold War
perspectives and, perhaps understandably, fails to account for the
revolution in thinking sparked in large part by the Rumsfeld
Commission Report. We don't think states like North Korea or Iran are
likely to use their missile and WMD programs as operational weapons of
war, prompting devastating retaliation. Rather, we have come to the
view that such states seek missile and WMD programs primarily as
weapons of coercive diplomacy, to complicate U.S. decision making or
limit our freedom to act in a crisis by, say, coming to the defense of
our South Korean ally.
So we have to avoid mirror-imaging. For coercive purposes, WMD-armed
ballistic missiles need not be deployed in large numbers or be highly
accurate and reliable. There is no need for robust test programs, or
for deployment of large numbers of missiles in dedicated long-term
deployment sites. That, combined with our uncertainties in assessing
the threat (e.g., the limits on our intelligence collection
capabilities, use of denial and deception, and uncertainties regarding
the amount of outside help), means our warning times have sharply
diminished. Only a few years ago, the U.S. intelligence community had
high confidence that it could provide five years warning of a
proliferant state's ICBM. It now considers a threat to have emerged
upon the first successful flight test, which could occur with perhaps
a few months warning, if that.
Finally, our European allies are concerned that NMD will lead to an
unraveling of the arms control process, undermine strategic stability,
and lead to a worsening of U.S./NATO relations with Russia and China.
This concern has undoubtedly been reinforced by the Senate's vote on
the CTBT and the Duma's refusal to date to ratify START II. Of course
we recognize the historic relationship between offense and defense.
The Clinton administration, however, rejects the idea that limited
modifications to the ABM Treaty are incompatible with further
reductions under START and the maintenance of strategic stability.
Objectively, a limited NMD will have no significant capability against
Russia's strategic force, even at much lower levels. Our challenge, of
course, is to demonstrate that convincingly to Russia.
NMD is also compatible with non-proliferation regimes. Our missile
non-proliferation strategy has three elements: to prevent the threat
from emerging in the first place, if it nonetheless does emerge to
deter its use or, failing that, to defend against it. Each of these
elements complements the others. Development of a limited NMD system
should not be taken as a signal that we have abandoned our efforts to
prevent proliferation or our ability to deter. But to the extent
prevention does not entirely succeed, and to the extent we cannot be
confident deterrence will work, defense also has a role.
Relations with Russia, and fears about NMD's impact on international
arms control and non-proliferation regimes, probably head the list of
allied concerns. Those concerns should largely evaporate if we can
reach agreement with Russia on ABM Treaty changes and START III.
In any event, we will be presenting these arguments to our European
allies over the coming weeks and months in a regular series of
briefings on our plans and our dialogue with Russia.
China
I've left the toughest case until last. While our dialogues with the
Russians and our allies are well under way, the same cannot be said
for China. I find this personally disappointing. I have worked for
some time to establish a strategic dialogue with the Chinese. The
accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade has been the
most recent setback in our attempts at engagement, and it came just
when the NMD issue was heating up. However, Deputy Secretary Talbott
did lead an interagency team to Beijing on February 17-18 for wide
ranging talks that provided our first real opportunity to engage the
Chinese on ballistic missile defense issues.
We have a lot to overcome. The Chinese information level on NMD is
very low (Strobe's trip offered the first opportunity to provide
threat and architecture briefings to a wide audience); and the
perceptual gaps are wide (the Chinese, like the Russians, connect dots
and see NMD as part of a grand design aimed at China).
That is not the case. We believe deterrence works in the context of
the U.S.-China relationship, as with Russia; we do not consider China
to be a rogue state; and we do not envision a future that would
require NMD protection against China.
Nevertheless, the objective facts are that China today has a small
strategic force, and the North Koreans live in the same neighborhood;
thus even a limited NMD system aimed at the North Korean threat could
also significantly erode China's deterrent capability against the U.S.
We need to manage our dialogue with China so they will not view a U.S.
decision to deploy a limited NMD as evidence of hostility or an effort
to undermine their security. We don't want NMD to give China
incentives to go beyond the ongoing strategic modernization program
they had planned before NMD became an issue. That could have
repercussions for CTBT, the (April-May) NPT Review Conference, and
South Asia. We also need to make sure NMD does not give China a reason
to curtail its adherence to existing arms control and
non-proliferation norms and regimes, or a reason to limit its future
cooperation with us.
In my personal view, China's response to NMD over time will likely
depend on more than a simple calculus of the number of strategic
warheads that can reach the U.S. Economics (and the importance of the
U.S. to China's economic advancement); the status of cross-strait
relations with Taiwan and U.S.-Taiwan policy; China's bilateral
relationship with Japan; and potential TMD deployments in the region
are all likely to rank above NMD in China's near-term hierarchy of
security considerations. In turn developments in these areas may well
shape China's response to NMD. To the degree we can break China's
perceptual linkages between NMD and both Taiwan and regional TMD
issues, and convince them that these issues have different dynamics,
that will help.
At this point, we are really at the informational level with China. We
need a regular strategic dialogue to allay Chinese concerns. Where we
go next, however, will likely depend on the overall tenor of our
broader relationship.
Conclusion
What should you take away from my talk?
First, that the Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott and I all treat the
fourth criterion very seriously, and that we view this criterion in a
broad fashion to include the impact of NMD on all aspects of the
"overall strategic environment."
Second, our intention is to ensure that the President has before him
all of the relevant considerations when he makes a decision on NMD
deployment this summer.
Third, no country will hold a veto over NMD deployment. In the end,
with the fullest possible information on all the costs and benefits
before him, the President will have to make a decision based on U.S.
security and the best interests of the American people.
But fourth, with friends and allies, with Russia and China, we will
listen, to be sure, but we also intend a vigorous dialogue. We believe
our approach to National Missile Defense can be carried out in
conformance with the core purpose of the ABM Treaty, with further
strategic reductions, with a stable strategic environment, and with
continued progress against proliferation. We intend to make the case,
in the spirit of Federalist Paper 63, that it is, indeed, "the
offspring of a wise and honorable policy," and deserves international
understanding and support.
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