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KOSOVO ONE YEAR ON : Achievement and Challenge
by LORD ROBERTSON OF PORT ELLEN, Secretary General of NATO |
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(Source : NATO ; issued March 21, 2000)
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(Editor's Note : This article was edited for space reasons. Parts relating to the political background of the Kosovo crisis and to other non-military issues were deleted. The complete, unabridged version of this article is posted on NATO's web-site.)
Introduction
A year ago, NATO launched its airpower to end the repression in Kosovo -
and succeeded. In the blizzard of words that has followed it is easy to
overlook that simple fact. Much is still misunderstood about what happened.
Now is an appropriate time to look back on what NATO did during the
conflict, to review what KFOR has achieved since, and to look ahead. The
risks were high - NATO faced many problems - and the price was high. But as
the Alliance promised at the time, Serb forces are out, KFOR is in, and the
refugees are home. However, there should be no illusions - the task
remaining is formidable.
The crisis was a long time in the making and cannot be solved in a year.
While an enormous amount has been achieved - often unheralded - no-one can
be satisfied with the current situation. But for those who have doubts, the
simple answer is to look at the alternatives. The OSCE report,
Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told, makes what happened appallingly clear,
painting a shocking picture of a planned campaign of violence against
Kosovar Albanian civilians. No-one was safe it says, "There is chilling
evidence of the murderous targeting of children, with the aim of
terrorizing and punishing adults and communities." If NATO had not acted,
then that spiral of violence would have intensified, and the death toll
escalated. There would now be many hundreds of thousands of refugees, with
neighbouring countries under pressure and the whole region destabilised.
Critics, including those who now criticise NATO for what it has done, would
be condemning the Alliance for what it had not done.
The challenge now, and by no means just for NATO, is to complete the job.
The air campaign and entry of KFOR have created a platform to build upon,
but that requires resources and continuing commitment, or there is a risk
that hard-won success could drift away. The people of Kosovo, and their
leaders, must also seize the opportunities presented, or risk losing the
goodwill and backing of the international community. It is ethnic hatred
that has brought disaster in the past, and however hard, however bitter the
memories, it must be set aside if the future is to be truly different.
It was Edmund Burke who said that for evil to triumph it is only necessary
for good men to do nothing. In March last year, NATO's 19 nations acted.
The following is my personal reflection on Kosovo one year on.
Background to the crisis
(this part deleted for space--Editor)
The Aims of the Air Campaign
NATO had given President Milosevic clear warning of what would happen if
the demands of the international community were ignored. The essence of
coercive diplomacy is that a threat of force, to be credible, must be
backed by real force if necessary. NATO was not bluffing.
On 12 April, by when it was clear that the Yugoslav government was
embarked on a policy of mass forced expulsion of Kosovar Albanians, the
North Atlantic Council confirmed the political justification for its
decision as follows:
"The unrestrained assault by Yugoslav military, police and paramilitary
forces, under the direction of President Milosevic, on Kosovar civilians
has created a massive humanitarian catastrophe, which also threatens to
destabilise the surrounding region. Hundreds of thousands of people have
been expelled ruthlessly from Kosovo by the FRY authorities. We condemn
these appalling violations of human rights and the indiscriminate use of
force by the Yugoslav government. These extreme and criminally
irresponsible policies, which cannot be defended on any grounds, have made
necessary and justify the military action by NATO.
NATO's military action against the FRY supports the political aims of the
international community: a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo in
which all its people can live in security and enjoy universal human rights
and freedoms on an equal basis."
The OSCE/ODIHR report confirms that the expulsions by the Yugoslav and Serb
forces were carried out "with evident strategic planning and in clear
violation of the laws and customs of war", and that "the violations
inflicted on the Kosovo Albanian population after 20 March were a
continuation of actions by Yugoslav and Serbian military forces that were
well rehearsed, insofar as they were already taking place in many locations
in Kosovo well before 20 March." In early April, details were revealed of a
covert Serb plan (Operation Horseshoe) to forcibly expel Kosovar Albanians
from Kosovo that had been drawn up months beforehand.
In undertaking the air campaign, NATO made clear the actions expected of
President Milosevic and his regime to bring a halt to his action:
1. ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending
of violence and repression;
2. ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and
paramilitary forces;
3. agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;
4. agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced
persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations;
5. provide credible assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of
the Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a political framework
agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law and the Charter
of the United Nations.
When these conditions were met by President Milosevic, the North Atlantic
Council, through the Secretary General, agreed to suspend air operations on
10 June 1999. Throughout the conflict, NATO made clear on many occasions
that it was not conducting a campaign to defeat Serbia or the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, and was not making war on the Serb people. This was
not a war. It was a careful operation to disrupt the Yugoslav campaign of
violence in Kosovo by attacking proportionately and appropriately the
military machine that was conducting these attacks. The Alliance engaged in
this campaign only to convince President Milosevic to comply with the
reasonable demands set out above. The end result was a far worse settlement
for the Yugoslav government than had been on offer at Rambouillet.
NATO did not take the decision to use military force easily. It is a
tribute to western democracies that they are so reluctant to take up arms.
Balancing the concerns and priorities of 19 nations with differing domestic
political pressures was an enormous challenge. Compromises were required
which may have complicated the military task. But that was the necessary
price of consensus, which lies at the very core of NATO. That is not a
cause for regret, but pride. In a situation fraught with political risk,
all NATO Allies agreed that action to prevent continuing repression in
Kosovo was imperative, and that it was essential that NATO should prevail.
The conduct of the air campaign
The concept for Operation Allied Force envisaged a phased air campaign,
designed to achieve NATO's political objectives with minimum force. The
phases ranged from a show of force in the initial stages, to operations
against Serb forces in Kosovo, expanding if necessary to targets throughout
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that supported the regime's ability to
attack the civilian population of Kosovo. It had been hoped, but never
assumed, that President Milosevic would quickly realise NATO's
determination, and accept its demands. Instead, his campaign of ethnic
cleansing escalated and, in response, NATO's leadership accelerated and
strengthened its air campaign considerably.
Selecting targets
The air campaign set out to weaken Serb military capabilities, both
strategically and tactically. Strikes on tactical targets, such as
artillery and field headquarters, had a more immediate effect in disrupting
the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. Strikes against strategic targets, such as
government ministries and refineries, had a longer-term and broader impact
on the Serb military machine. Just over 38,000 combat sorties, including
10,484 strike sorties, were flown by Allied forces, with no Allied combat
fatalities - a remarkable achievement.
Initially, it was vital to defeat the Serb air defence network. This proved
a tough challenge, as it was highly developed and had many mobile elements.
But without air superiority, NATO would not have been able effectively to
achieve its military objectives while protecting its own forces, and the
ability of Allied forces to strike military targets precisely and minimise
"collateral damage" would have been reduced. While NATO successfully
suppressed the threat, it was never eliminated, requiring constant
vigilance throughout the campaign.
The bulk of NATO's effort against tactical targets was aimed at military
facilities, fielded forces, heavy weapons, and military vehicles and
formations in Kosovo and southern Serbia. Many of these targets were highly
mobile and hard to locate, especially during the poor weather of the early
phase of the campaign. Strikes were also complicated by the cynical Serb
use of civilian homes and buildings to hide weapons and vehicles, the
intermixing of military vehicles with civilian convoys and, sometimes, the
use of human shields. In this way, NATO's concern to avoid civilian
casualties was exploited by the Serbs. But the constant presence of NATO
aircraft inhibited the Serbs by forcing them into hiding and frequently
punishing them when they did venture out.
Strategic targets included Serb air defences, command and control
facilities, Yugoslav military (VJ) and police (MUP) forces headquarters,
and supply routes. NATO was sometimes criticised for such strikes, by those
who said NATO's actions also risked both civilians and civilian property.
In fact, the Alliance carefully selected targets based on their role in the
Serb war effort. Facilities were only attacked when it was assessed that
they made an effective contribution to the Yugoslav military effort and
that their destruction offered a definite military advantage. Massive
effort was made to minimise the impact of the air campaign on the Serb
civilian population.
Minimising the risk to civilians
The selection of targets was carefully reviewed at multiple levels of
command, as well as by the Allies carrying out the strikes. These reviews
ensured they complied with international law, were militarily justified,
and minimised the risk to civilian lives and property.
In fact, the concern to avoid unintential damage was a principal
constraining factor throughout. Many targets were not attacked because the
risk to non-combatants was considered too high. But such restrictions did
not alter the ultimate outcome. Modern technology, the skill of NATO's
pilots, and control over target selection made it possible for the Alliance
to succeed with remarkably few civilian casualties.
The actual toll in human lives will never be precisely known, but the
independent group, Human Rights Watch, has estimated that there were 90
incidents involving civilian deaths, in which between 488 and 527 civilians
may have lost their lives - 87 of these at Korisa, where the Serb forces
forced civilians to occupy a known military target. These figures are far
lower than the 1,200-5,700 civilian deaths claimed by the Yugoslavs.
NATO deeply regrets any civilian casualties it caused, but these losses
must be viewed in perspective against what NATO was seeking to prevent, and
the actions of the Belgrade regime. Any historical study shows that
Alliance aircrew set and achieved remarkably high standards. It is
unrealistic to expect all risk to be eliminated. This is something that was
well understood and was frequently stated openly by Kosovar Albanians
themselves.
Despite cynical Serb attempts to exploit images of accidental civilian
casualties from NATO air strikes, the Alliance held firm. President
Milosevic calculated that if he held on long enough, it would weaken. He
was wrong. The length of the air campaign did put stress on the Allies, but
the unity and common purpose that lies at the core of NATO was equal to it.
The steady increase in Allied airpower and effectiveness, and the
realisation that NATO was holding together played a fundamental part in the
Serb climb-down.
(The following two parts deleted for space--Editor)
The job is not yet done: Assessing remaining challenges
A just and necessary action
Could it have been done better?
It is a strength of our democracies that even when a military operation is
successful and commands overwhelming international support, many will
question whether it should have been undertaken - on policy or legal
grounds - and, once undertaken, whether it should have been conducted
differently. A year on, it is worth reviewing such criticism to try to
present the issues fairly. The main questions raised about NATO's actions
are as follows:
Did the international community insist on conditions that made a failure of
the Rambouillet talks inevitable?
Some suggest that by insisting on a NATO-led international military force
to oversee any settlement agreed at Rambouillet, the Contact Group made it
impossible for the Yugoslav authorities to agree to the Accords, which
would otherwise have been acceptable. It is further claimed that the rights
of this force on Yugoslav territory would have been so extensive that the
Serbs were bound to reject them.
It is true that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia resisted the idea of a
NATO-led force to guarantee any agreement, however, President Milosevic's
record speaks for itself. The international community had to take account
of the fact that President Milosevic had repeatedly failed to honour
previous agreements and that an international security presence was
essential to guarantee that the Accords would be honoured. Also, without
such a presence, the Kosovar Albanian side would not have given their
agreement.
The rights such a force would have needed to operate on Yugoslav territory
were based on a standard agreement on the status of forces that has been
used on many other occasions. These rights were not raised as an issue at
the time, and so cannot be blamed for the breakdown.
Despite the provision for an international security presence, the
Rambouillet Accords recognised Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo and
permitted a VJ and MUP presence and role in the province. The agreement,
which provided for an interim status for the province for a period of three
years, would have protected the rights of all sides. As a result of the
Yugoslav government's refusal to negotiate in good faith, Serb forces were
ultimately expelled from Kosovo - a far worse outcome than had been on
offer at Rambouillet.
Were NATO's actions legally justified without a mandate from the UN
Security Council ?
Some argue that NATO should not have acted against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in Kosovo without a specific United Nations Security Council
mandate. The Allies were sensitive to the legal basis for their action. The
Yugoslavs had already failed to comply with numerous demands from the
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and there was a major
discussion in the North Atlantic Council, during which the Council took the
following factors into consideration:
o the Yugoslav government's non-compliance with earlier UN Security Council
resolutions,
o the warnings from the UN Secretary General about the dangers of a
humanitarian disaster in Kosovo,
o the risk of such a catastrophe in the light of Yugoslavia's failure to
seek a peaceful resolution of the crisis,
o the unlikelihood that a further UN Security Council resolution would be
passed in the near future,
o and the threat to peace and security in the region.
At that point, the Council agreed that a sufficient legal basis existed for
the Alliance to threaten and, if necessary, use force against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.
Had NATO not acted, the Yugoslav regime would have continued its brutal
repression of the Albanian population of Kosovo. Today those who survived
the ethnic savagery and the ravages of the winter would still be living in
refugee camps outside their country, and the region would have been
condemned to continuing warfare and instability for years to come.
Did the Alliance do enough to avoid "collateral damage", and did NATO
planes fly too high to be effective?
Some have suggested that, despite the low civilian casualties, NATO should
still have done more to protect civilians. In fact, as explained above,
NATO planners went to great lengths to minimise such risks, in keeping with
the laws of armed conflict.
Apart from ensuring the relevance of each target to the military campaign,
the kind of weapons used were chosen to reduce to an absolute minimum the
risk of unintended damage. Targets were studied to determine the distance
between the intended impact point and any civilian facilities. Timings of
attacks were restricted to minimise the chance of civilians being nearby.
Aircrew flew under strict rules of engagement, and were directed to break
off any attack if they were worried there was too much risk of what is
known as "collateral damage". Despite all this, it was inevitable that some
mistakes would occur and that weapon systems would sometimes malfunction.
Top priority was given to investigating mistakes and applying any lessons
learned.
The exact figures for civilian casualties in the air campaign will never be
known, and NATO has had no access to target areas outside Kosovo. However,
the independent group, Human Rights Watch, estimates there were 90
incidents involving civilian fatalities, which suggests that less than one
per cent of the 10,484 NATO strike sorties led to civilian deaths.
Critics argue that measures to reduce the risks to our aircrew, which
prevented them operating below certain altitudes, made it harder to find
targets and decreased bombing accuracy. This is not the case. Modern weapon
systems can strike from great ranges and heights with extreme accuracy. As
aircrew themselves have pointed out, flying above most enemy air defences
allowed time to properly identify targets, even circling them, before
striking. It is not even true that all strikes were conducted from high
levels. As the campaign developed, and conditions allowed, some aircraft
operated down to 6,000 feet. A balance had to be struck between the risks
taken, and the likely results. Poor weather and the need to avoid
unintended damage were both far more important targeting constraints than
operating heights.
Ultimately, air-power achieved its goals. In contrast, the Serb strategy
failed. They had hoped to outlast NATO and to inflict losses that would
undermine public support in Allied countries. Their inability to do so was
one of the failures that in the end forced them to accept the international
community's demands.
Was NATO's bombing campaign poorly conceived and executed?
Some argue that NATO's air campaign should have been more aggressive,
striking at the heart of power in Belgrade at an earlier stage, while
others have criticised NATO's decision not to deploy ground troops for an
invasion of Kosovo.
Such a debate is theoretical - NATO won with the strategy it used. Airpower
worked. We must not forget that NATO decided to employ military force to
achieve limited political objectives - to end the violence and repression -
not to militarily defeat Yugoslavia. As mentioned elsewhere, President
Milosevic's only hope was to divide the Alliance, so any NATO strategy had
to preserve Alliance unity and to reflect the democratic wishes of all 19
nations. Avoiding unnecessary suffering among the Serb population was also
vital in maintaining public and international support for NATO's actions.
As the Serb repression in Kosovo accelerated, NATO responded quickly to
intensify the air campaign. And as the air campaign lengthened other
military options were seriously discussed at NATO and in national capitals.
Nations were understandably reluctant to launch a ground invasion, which
would have been time-consuming, difficult and expensive, in terms of lives
as well as money and equipment. Nevertheless, many believe that NATO would
have taken this step if necessary. It is probable that President Milosevic
came to believe that we would do so, if necessary, and this may have been
one of the reasons for his capitulation.
Did NATO deliberately mislead the public concerning the success of its air
strikes against Serb forces in Kosovo?
There is still debate over the amount of Serb weapons and equipment
destroyed. Numbers cited are often contradictory and unsubstantiated. For
its part, the Alliance and individual member nations have extensively
studied the air campaign's effectiveness to learn the lessons. On 16
September 1999, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Wesley Clark,
briefed the press on the findings of NATO's Kosovo Mission Effectiveness
Assessment Team. During this briefing, he said NATO carried out successful
strikes against 93 tanks, 153 armoured personnel carriers (APCs), 339
military vehicles and 389 artillery pieces and mortars.
In June, with the conflict still underway, it was estimated 120 tanks, 314
artillery pieces and 203 APCs had been struck. Given the extreme difficulty
of judging results during combat, and without access on the ground, these
figures stand comparison with later assessments, and show how hard NATO
tried to give accurate information during the conflict. It should also be
noted that although this still left the Serbs with many hundreds of
armoured vehicles in Kosovo, they had mostly been hidden throughout the
conflict.
Relying on numbers also misses the point. When General Clark was asked how
many targets NATO destroyed he simply replied: "Enough." Overall, NATO's
air campaign forced President Milosevic to accede to the demands of the
international community, achieving the Alliance's political objectives.
This is the ultimate measure of NATO's success.
Did NATO's air campaign itself cause the ethnic cleansing it intended to stop?
Some claim the brutal ethnic cleansing, violence and refugee exodus was
precipitated by NATO's air campaign. The facts do not support this.
President Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was well prepared and
rehearsed, as the OSCE/ODIHR report shows. It was preceded by a military
build-up that was underway even as the Rambouillet talks were in progress.
Later intelligence showed that he had a pre-planned strategy (Operation
Horseshoe) to drive the Kosovar Albanian population out of Kosovo.
What we also know is that he tried to implement this brutal strategy of
ethnic cleansing, but failed. Those refugees are now home. Instead of
hiding in hills, sitting in refugee camps, or being scattered throughout
Europe, the vast majority of Kosovar Albanians were brought home within
months. In comparison, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are still an
estimated one-third of a million refugees, with over twice that number
internally displaced. The firm and timely response of NATO and the
international community stopped a vicious spiral of violence in its tracks.
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