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Speaking Notes for Sept.30 speech by Art Eggleton, Canadian Minister of National Defence,
at Harvard University Commencement ceremonies ; Boston, Massachusetts
Canadian Lessons From the KosovoCrisis
The title which you have chosen for this Conference - Allied Forces or Forced Allies" - has the virtue of being both catchy and timely, coming as it does on the heels of the NATO meetings in Toronto.
Before suggesting some of the lessons learned from Kosovo, let me make the obvious observation that Kosovo is not some past event, frozen in amber, quietly awaiting dissection at the hands of historians.
The fact is, we have entered into a new stage, filled with new difficulties and dangers. Keeping the peace will not be easy. Hazards abound. The politics are very touchy. And I’m sure that Kosovo still has many new lessons to teach us.
Having said that, I think we can formulate some provisional lessons and cast aside a few myths.
Let me deal with two issues - perhaps the most difficult issues - at the outset: the lack of a United Nations mandate and the relationship of state sovereignty to humanitarian horrors.
First, the question of a United Nations mandate. That we would have preferred to have such a mandate goes without saying. In an ideal world, it would have been obtained. But we did not have the luxury of waiting for an ideal solution.
The situation which had developed in Kosovo was one that could be neither tolerated nor condoned. More than 470,000 people had been displaced from their homes and the campaign of terror, which Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic had started, showed no signs of slowing down.
Something had to be done.
Of course, we would have much rather avoided conflict all together. And so we explored every corridor of diplomacy. Indeed, we were criticized for giving Milosevic too many chances. But when our hope for a peaceful solution failed, force became necessary.
At the same time, we faced the certain knowledge that some members of the UN Security Council were prepared to use their veto. So, we had a choice: we could stand on ceremony, plead that there was no UN mandate, and wash our hands of the whole matter. Or, we could stand on principle, roll up our sleeves and get to work.
And I have no doubt that we made the right decision. Our cause was just. Our responsibility was clear. And our response was appropriate.
Does this mean that the UN is irrelevant? Of course not. Canada continues to believe that the UN is the most appropriate multilateral body with the political authority to deal with international security issues. I have no doubt that when the next crisis presents itself, our first choice - and our preferred option - will be to seek a UN-based solution. Indeed, the evolving situation in East Timor bears witness to the UN’s continued relevance.
What Kosovo did show, however, was that under pressing circumstances, gridlock in the UN will not be allowed to thwart the determination of the international community to avert humanitarian tragedies.
The second issue, that of weighing the right of state sovereignty and the demands of humanitarian intervention, is also more nuanced than some would have it.
To be sure, the importance of recognizing state sovereignty is a principle as old as the Peace of Westphalia and as eloquent as Woodrow Wilson’s statement on the right to self-determination.
But there has always been a tension between this principle and what might be called the "Nuremberg principles" - principles which have been embodied in the second half of this century in such documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention Against Genocide.
Our actions in Kosovo declared, in no uncertain terms, that mass murder is an act of moral repugnance, not the prerogative of a sovereign state. And an important step was taken toward a world in which certain fundamental rights are not the privilege of citizenship, but the birthright of humanity.
I believe that is a step in the right direction. But I am not under any illusion that we have set ourselves on a path from which there will be no deviation or exception.
Where a body such as NATO can act, and act effectively, I believe we should. But not on every occasion or under every circumstance. Because while our impulse to act justly may be inexhaustible, our resources are not. And as President Clinton has aptly said, to promise too much is just as cruel as caring too little.
The hard fact is that we can’t do everything or be everywhere.
Rather, we must see human security and humanitarian intervention as part of a continuum - one with both civil and military dimensions - and allocate our resources appropriately. Our response will sometimes be civil in nature, at other times it will be military and at other times a combination of both.
That is the precedent that was set at Kosovo; not that there will automatically be military intervention by NATO wherever these issues arise, but only that military action is now an option we are willing to consider, if such action would be practical and effective.
Now, clearly there are significant differences between taking military action in self-defence, where vital national interests are at stake, and doing so in order to redress a humanitarian crisis elsewhere.
In humanitarian interventions, achieving consensus among allies and maintaining public support for military operations present some particular challenges. It is one thing to mobilize public opinion when the danger is close or the threat immediate. It is quite another to put our forces in harm’s way when the operations are far from home and our national security is not imperiled.
And while I am pleased that Canadian public opinion held firm - supporting our forces and endorsing their mission - I also recognize that maintaining that support would have become more difficult had the mission been prolonged or the casualty list grown.
These same challenges - of handling public opinion - will almost certainly be faced any time we consider military action for humanitarian purposes. That is a clear lesson from Kosovo.
Another very important lesson of the Kosovo campaign was that military force, for all of its technological sophistication, remains a blunt instrument. It is not laser surgery.
That’s why great care must always be taken in the decision to employ military force and why we need to balance these limitations with the moral imperative to act.
We need to weigh the implications of what is likely to happen if we fail to act and ask ourselves what price we are less willing to pay. In Kosovo, the Alliance was not willing to stand idly by in the face of ethnic cleansing, even though we knew that by acting, those we sought to help would also pay a price.
So Kosovo put the dilemmas of using military force for humanitarian purposes into sharp relief.
On this occasion, the right decision was to act. In another, the right decision might be to refrain. In either case, national leaders will need to face these issues and make well-informed choices.
One of the very practical lessons learned from Kosovo was the need to enhance the capability of our forces to act as one. For example, the Alliance experienced difficulties with radios using different encryption systems, which in some cases made it impossible to talk with one another.
All members of the Alliance must be interoperable and to do that, there needs to be a conscious effort to reduce any gaps in capability.
For our part, Canada has taken a number of steps to enhance our interoperability. In Kosovo, Canadian CF-18's were able to mesh seamlessly because of the level of training we do with the U.S. and UK Air Forces.
And we are committed to remaining interoperable with all of our NATO allies.
Let me also say that Canada is encouraged by the intentions expressed by our European allies to undertake improvements to their capabilities - and by extension, to those of the Alliance.
Another aspect of working together as a team is the need to streamline communications and decision-making.
As might be expected in a campaign involving 19 nations, the decision-making apparatus in Kosovo was, at times, cumbersome and slow.
There has been much discussion and about the relationship between political considerations and military imperatives. Let me just say that I believe political leaders must retain ultimate authority over operations such as Kosovo. This means, among other things, setting the strategic parameters of the mission. The day to day prosecution of the operation can be left to the military commanders, but political leaders cannot wash their hands of military decisions with significant political repercussions.
Finally, no responsible government in the Alliance can place its military in harm's way without being fully involved in the decision-making process.
For future campaigns, I believe NATO needs to focus on its decision-making processes to ensure more timely decisions, but not at the expense of political considerations.
Let me turn for a moment to one of the lessons that I think we should not draw from the Kosovo campaign, and that is that air power alone delivered victory.
To be sure, the aerial bombardment exacted a terrible toll. But it would be wrong to assume that that was the only pressure affecting the calculations of the Milosevic regime.
Diplomacy also had a role to play. The Alliance clearly explained, on an ongoing basis, its reasons for acting and the conditions required for peace, not only to our own people but to the international community in general and the Yugoslav government in particular.
With few exceptions, the international community supported our action, leading to the near total isolation of the Yugoslav Government. This isolation, together with the indictments by the International Crimes Tribunal for Yugoslavia, placed the Milosevic regime on very lonely ground.
And certainly the pressure brought to bear by Yugoslavia's traditional ally, Russia, was also a vital consideration.
It was, therefore, military power combined with diplomatic efforts that ultimately carried the day.
Although the Alliance did not work perfectly, success must be measured by the achievement of key objectives.
And in that respect, there can be no doubt that our campaign was successful: Milosevic’s troops were forced to return home and the ethnic Albanians are returning to their homeland.
And while it is true that we could not prevent the ethnic cleansing from occurring, had we done nothing, an entire people would have been obliterated, an entire region would have been destabilized. And the damage would have been permanent.
The operation was also a success on another level as well: and that is the fundamental unity that prevailed within the Alliance under difficult and demanding circumstances. That unity provided an eloquent reply to those who said that NATO could not speak with one voice or act with one resolve.
Given that this was the first offensive action taken by NATO in its 50 year history, this solidarity represents a significant achievement.
Let me turn for just a moment to Canada’s involvement in the Kosovo campaign. As a Canadian, and as a Minister of Defence within the NATO Alliance, I am very proud of that involvement.
Canadian pilots flew 682 combat sorties, or nearly 10% of the missions against fixed ground targets - and they led about half the strike packages they took part in. We were also among only five countries delivering precision guided munitions. So our contribution was significant.
Now, the question is being asked if the Alliance - and in particular the United States - encouraged us to act against our better judgement or contrary to our interests. Let me set the record straight.
Canada was among the strongest proponents of NATO action precisely because such action was fully consistent with our own values and interests. Canada was one of the key founders of NATO. We have been actively engaged in peace keeping operations from Cyprus to Bosnia.
So let there be no doubt: in going to Kosovo, we followed our instincts as well as our allies.
As I close, let me suggest one overriding lesson of Kosovo - a lesson that history has often tried to teach us, but which we often seem to forget.
And that is that in any crisis as complicated as Kosovo, perfect solutions are usually beyond reach.
Many people overlook this in the rush to proclaim the political lessons of any important event. But politics, as you know, is the art of the possible. And when 19 nations must agree on a difficult course of action; when time is short and tensions are high; when children are dying and human suffering is increasing, perfect solutions rarely present themselves.
And so we must temper our judgements with an appreciation for the differences between the detached perspective of hindsight and the incomplete vision of the moment.
Of course, it is both appropriate and necessary, afterwards, to ask how can we do better the next time.
Indeed, in the post-cold war era, when NATO is being called upon to assume new responsibilities and face new challenges, it is vital that these lessons be learned and learned well.
I believe "Kosovo" demonstrated NATO to be an effective instrument of Euro-Atlantic security and stability. But if NATO is to continue to play that role, we must learn from our successes as well as from our failures.
Any lessons that we can learn, therefore, or insights that you can give us, will make an invaluable contribution as we adapt NATO for the 21st century.
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