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Incoming Chairman of NATO's Military Committee
Brussels, 30 June 1999
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is a pleasure for me to join you this afternoon for this, my initial
press conference, in my new capacity as the Chairman of the Military
Committee. For one, it allows us the opportunity to get to know one
another and for two, it provides me a chance to provide you some of my
initial thoughts on our operations in and around Kosovo.
But before I share some of those personal impressions, allow me to address
directly two questions some of you might have, namely why did I take over
the Chairmanship in the middle of an ongoing operation and why am I, almost
two months later, only now doing my first press conference.
With respect to the former, there is no doubt that assuming the
Chairmanship in the middle of NATO's Air Campaign against the brutal regime
in Belgrade looks indeed like trying to jump aboard a quickly moving train.
But the leap was, in fact, no where near as imposing as it may have
appeared for several reasons. First, I was, and had been, an integral part
of the Alliance military decision-making process for the past five years in
my capacity as the Italian Chief of Defence Staff. Hence, I was already
quite familiar with many of the pressing Alliance issues. This was well
known to my Chief of Defense colleagues, who made the choice and confirmed
the takeover date. Second, unlike the operational commander, SACEUR in this
case, who needs to be intimately aware of all operational matters, my role
as the CMC is to provide military advice to the Secretary General and to
the North Atlantic Council. Thus, I normally deal with strategic, policy
or politico-military issues and am the interface between the Alliance
political and military authorities. This function is extremely similar in
nature to my previous appointment, but as Chairman, I have the added
advantage of being able to draw upon the expertise of the Military
Committee, the International Military Staff here at NATO Headquarters, the
advice of my predecessor, which I shared wholeheartedly, and last but not
least, the support of the SECGEN. As a result, I can state with confidence
that the quality of military advice proffered to the Council has not
diminished.
As for not giving a press conference earlier, the reasoning is very simple.
While the Alliance was fully engaged in its first combat operations, my
place and forum to speak, offer advice and discuss issues was either in the
Council or in the Military Committee. Personally, I did not deem speaking
to the media was appropriate since under such warlike circumstances, the
Alliance needs to be heard with one voice. For political and policy
matters that voice was the Secretary General himself, or his spokesman,
while for military matters, it was the operational commander, General Clark.
But with Operation ALLIED FORCE suspended and KFOR fully engaged working to
create a secure and stable multi-ethnic environment in Kosovo in which all
can prosper in peace and democracy, I feel now is a good time to review our
accomplishments to date and look forward to the challenges which await us.
Given your profession and experience, I realize there is no requirement for
me to summarize NATO's Air Campaign and the related operations. What I
believe is of more interest at this stage is to assess the lessons learned
so that the Alliance is better prepared and structured to address crises of
the future. It is, however, too early to extract all the lessons learned
with precision since much research and analysis has yet to be completed.
That said, there are a few broad military lessons which I feel I can draw
with confidence.
The first is that the United States not only provided over 70% of the air
assets (confirm) for NATO's Air Campaign, it also provided the lion's share
of the sophisticated aircraft and weaponry. Indeed, without the United
States' assets, the European Alliance members and Canada could never have
mounted a successful air campaign such as this. Quite frankly, they simply
do not have the capacity. Once again, the American national contribution
to Alliance efforts was absolutely instrumental to achieve NATO's overall
success. Or put another way, unless there exists a real European resolve
to acquire the necessary resources, the European Defence and Security
Identity will remain nothing more than a noble concept.
The second military lesson learned I wish to highlight today deals with
intelligence. It is now obvious that in this day and age good military
intelligence is not sufficient to ensure success. Indeed, in a crisis
prevention/crisis management scenario such as Kosovo, it was the broader
aspects of intelligence, specifically those in non-military fields, which
can often hold the keys to success or failure. Thus NATO, which has few
intelligence assets of its own and which is already dependent on its member
nations for intelligence contributions, must solicit its members for
considerably more than was previously the case, if it wishes to remain
inside the decision-cycle of any potential adversary. This implies both
the acquisition of additional intelligence platforms, the Alliance Ground
Surveillance being a case in point, and an expansion and reorientation of
actual intelligence efforts into more non-military domains.
A third lesson for your consideration concerns NATO's force structures.
The Kosovo crisis demonstrated quite clearly that the Alliance needs
sufficient modern mission-effective forces with the necessary readiness and
availability. These latter two capabilities are crucial if we wish to
improve, as we must, our ability to react to emergencies. This is an
urgent requirement since while we did our best this time, such as
pre-deployments into FYROM, we were surprisingly close to our limit.
Indeed, one needs only to recall that to support the Kosovo-related
operations, the Alliance had to deploy virtually all of its immediate and
rapid reaction forces including AMF (L), the ARRC, SNFM, SNFL, MCMNorth,
and MCMM (confirm formations and acronyms). What if another crisis had
developed elsewhere? Undoubtedly, we must reinforce the Alliance's force
structure. Not only does this make military sense, it also makes sound
political sense since the availability of more such units provide the
Alliance political authorities more flexibility in their options and
greater time, if desired, to make decisions. As an aside, I can assure you
that we in the Military Committee are seized with this issue and that we
will address the full force structure implications shortly.
The last lesson I wish to underline is the value of the Partnership for
Peace Programme. Expand further… Include incredible value of support from
neighbouring nations highlighting invaluable assistance rendered by Albania
and FYROM under the most trying of circumstances… Flesh out.
All in all, the NATO Air Campaign was a very complex operation aimed to
achieve the so-called five conditions. Spread over a long period, hampered
by often unfavourable weather conditions, and hindered by a number of
well-known constraints, the campaign itself presented a daunting challenge.
But in the end, the Alliance proved to be more than a match for the
challenge and we believe that the air campaign successfully achieved its
aims. That success rested on two pillars. The first was the cohesion of
all Alliance members, reinforced by the strength of the transatlantic link,
in the face of a European human tragedy. The second is the quality,
training, professionalism and dedication of the men and women serving in
the forces of our member nations and their outstanding commanders.
And it is, ladies and gentlemen, many of these same exceptional NATO
servicemen and servicewomen who, having secured the peace in Kosovo, are
now presently engaged and contributing to build a new future for this
war-torn province and Her inhabitants. Indeed, members of KFOR or the
elements which support KFOR, these fine Alliance officers, senior
non-commissioned officers and men are now part of a larger, international
effort to restore hope and stability to Kosovo. Under the lead of the
United Nations, several key international institutions such as the UNHCR,
the OSCE, the EU and the ICTY have already commenced coordinating and
cooperating hand in glove with KFOR to achieve our common objective.
Moreover, we are also fortunate that several NGOs including the ICRC are
deeply committed to achieve similar aims.
Speaking of international effort, even the composition of KFOR will change
as it transforms itself from a purely Alliance force to a truly
international military enterprise. In fact, SHAPE has already received
offers from Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland,
Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and
Ukraine. In addition, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, Switzerland and the United
Arab Emirates have indicated their intentions to contribute to the NATO-led
Force in Kosovo. Furthermore, Russia, as a consequence of the Helsinki
Agreement, has agreed to contribute a sizeable contingent to KFOR and has
finalized Her detailed arrangements with SHAPE only yesterday (or) is
finalizing Her detailed arrangements with SHAPE as I speak. Needless to
say, all these developments are all very positive, especially the latter,
given Russia's important role in assisting the efforts of the international
community to get the Belgrade regime to accept the five conditions. And
for our part, we in NATO warmly welcome the participation of all these
nations, and any others who may wish to join us, in the collective effort
to promote and maintain a secure and stable environment so that
reconstruction and reconciliation can take root.
I have no doubt the challenges ahead of KFOR are still numerous and
imposing. But when you combine the extremely competent leadership and
proven structures of KFOR with the unified will of all participating
nations exemplified by their servicemen and women, and when you then
combine this potent mixture with the complementary efforts of so many
international institutions, organizations and agencies, it is hard to
imagine anything but ultimate mission success for KFOR. And on this
optimistic note, ladies and gentlemen, I believe now is a good time to stop
and to take your questions.
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