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Speech by Australian Defence Minister John Moore
at China's National Defence University
Beijing, 25 May 1999
Introduction
I am very pleased to have this opportunity to speak to you today, as part of the first visit to China by an Australian Minister for Defence.
I am proud to be part of this historic step forward in our bilateral defence relationship, especially, in this historic year… the 50th anniversary of the People’s Republic.
My visit is at the invitation of General Chi who visited Australia in February last year… the first visit to Australia by a Chinese Defence Minister.
I believe that these visits confirm, at the highest level, our shared commitment to a substantive bilateral defence relationship.
That relationship reflects our common interest in the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. It also demonstrates that each country wishes to have a deeper understanding of the other country’s views on defence and security matters.
I would like to focus on 3 things today.
The challenges and opportunities that I see ahead for the security of the Asia-Pacific;
How Australia sees China’s role and responsibilities; and
How Australia is adjusting its defence and security posture, to address our changing security environment.
The Changing Strategic Environment
The security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region is a common interest and the collective responsibility of all states in the region.
We have all experienced the rewards of stability. Over the past 25 years, the Asia-Pacific’s share of world GDP climbed steadily, to the point where it became the new economic centre for the world economy. China shared in, and contributed to, this remarkable process. By 1998, China had become the world’s eleventh-largest trading nation, with total trade exceeding US$320 billion.
But the energy and creativity that many nations have displayed on the economic and trade fronts have not been fully matched on the security front.
It is timely that nations work together to correct this imbalance. We must, as a community of states, begin more deliberately to:
Defuse potential sources of crisis; and
Set about developing inclusive mechanisms and processes which will give us the best chance of coping, peacefully, with the challenges that lie ahead.
And make no mistake. These challenges are formidable. The end of the Cold War a decade ago was, in every respect, a positive development. But it made the international arena more complex. As the strictures imposed by the Cold War fell away, international affairs everywhere became more fluid and less predictable. The management of international affairs, from the standpoint of security and stability, has become more challenging.
Recent instability
The past 18 months have seen a number of events in our region that have complicated, even further, our strategic environment. Political instability caused by the Asian economic downturn, the nuclear and missile tests by India and Pakistan, and the ballistic missile test by North Korea, are clear examples. The regional economic crisis has had a substantial impact on the economic and political stability of a number of countries.
It has resulted in a welcome but uncertain process of political change in Indonesia; It has brought about economic hardship in a number of countries, as well as increasing the pace of economic reform; and It has notably affected defence spending, which has impacted on current defence capabilities and force modernisation plans.
The economic crisis has dented the region’s self-confidence and brought about a more uncertain environment in which disputes could more quickly escalate and damage security relations between states.
China’s Role
Throughout history, China has been a country of imposing proportions. China’s changing fortunes have inevitably shaped the world around it. As the People’s Republic approaches its 50th anniversary, China is steadily reclaiming its status as a great power.
In the 50 years identified in the New Directions set by Deng Xiao Ping in 1978 a very short period China is expected to transform into one of the world’s largest economies. You will import, manufacture, consume and export on a scale that will have global ramifications. And your economic influence and military capacity, even with what you regard as a modest defence effort, will figure largely in shaping events in East Asia.
How China manages its re-emergence as a great power, and how others respond, is the most important strategic issue for the early decades of the 21st Century. It will require an abundance of statesmanship from all corners of the Asia-Pacific. At the same time, much will depend on China herself. With great power comes great responsibility. The emergence of a new major power within a region as dynamic as ours, is always challenging.
Accommodating the challenge requires openness and trust from all of us. We therefore need to deepen the habits of dialogue in our region. We need to listen, as well as talk. We all should possess the courage to be open and transparent about our security perceptions and concerns. This also is true when it comes to the military posture we believe we need, to address the challenges, as we see them.
For all these reasons, Australia attaches great importance to developing its defence relationship with China.
We want to better understand your defence and security concerns. We are prepared to reciprocate fully in explaining our concerns. We want to work with China to preserve and strengthen the stability and security of the Asia-Pacific.
Australia’s Approach
Australia’s approach to managing our defence and wider security interests, begins with an appreciation of our own place in the world, and, in particular, our place in the Asia-Pacific. Australia has followed a policy of defence self-reliance for many years. Self-reliance means that Australia conducts its defence planning, and acquires its defence capabilities, to meet its own particular defence needs. These needs are defined by our geography and our interests in the stability and security of our region.
Defence Regional Engagement
Australia is a significant Middle power. We are a large island continent with substantial natural resources. We also enjoy important natural defences, in the form of sheer distance and a large, air-sea gap. Nonetheless, Australia has always taken a keen interest in the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific. We have fought in 3 major conflicts in the region, in defence of these interests.
However, it is fair to say that until about 25 years ago, we primarily thought in terms of security from Asia. Today, we recognise that our future is tied to that of the Asia-Pacific, in every way. In particular, our economy is based on trade with the region. Japan, Korea and China are among our largest trading partners.
In short, we see our national well-being, as dependent upon the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific. It is also fair to say that Australia’s defence diplomacy and defence engagement efforts have been at the vanguard of this profound change in our approach towards our neighbours in Asia. We now seek security, in the broadest sense, with our neighbours. We and our neighbours view each other as natural partners, with common strategic and security interests.
Southeast Asia
Our efforts have naturally been focussed on Southeast Asia. This is where many of our interests, not least our security interests, are most directly engaged. And this is where our capacity to help shape developments is greatest. Developments affecting our closest neighbours, namely Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, have a direct and immediate effect on Australia’s security. Much of Australia’s trade flows through the Southeast Asian region. Instability there, could substantially affect Australia’s economic prosperity. More generally, a Southeast Asian community made-up of strong, stable, self-confident states, is very much to Australia’s advantage.
I am confident that China shares this interest.
Australia has substantial defence relationships with the major Southeast Asian nations. These are both bilateral and multi-lateral. These relationships have survived the test of economic crisis. In a number of cases, they have developed into new areas.
As a nation, we have devoted a great deal of energy and resources to building substantial defence relationships with the countries of Southeast Asia. Australia threatens no-one’s security. Rather, Australia has a direct interest in the stability and prosperity of Southeast Asia. Our Defence Force is professional and capable. Its training and advice are highly regarded in Southeast Asia. Combined with our relative strategic weight, this gives Australia significant standing and influence in Southeast Asia. Australia’s commitment to remaining engaged with Southeast Asia during the economic crisis, has deepened the confidence of these nations in Australia’s role in the Region.
I know that the countries of Southeast Asia are also appreciative of the actions taken by China, which have helped reduce the impact of the Crisis. The crisis has produced significant changes in the security environment of Southeast Asia. One change has been the reductions in defence spending in a number of countries.
At the same time, the roles of defence forces and their relationship to Government and society have been evolving. This has prompted, in some countries, moves for defence force reform. Australia has sought to do more in this area, bilaterally, by sharing our experience and expertise. For example, senior leaders of the Australian Defence Force have been working with their Indonesian counterparts to help Indonesia’s armed forces redefine their relationship with the civil government of Indonesia. Another consequence of reduced defence spending has been a growing disparity in capability levels between countries in Southeast Asia.
Without careful management, this situation could lead to misunderstanding, and increased tension and suspicion. It is Australia’s view that the ongoing United States strategic presence in the Region has helped minimise the uncertainty created by the economic crisis, as well as the deeper changes associated with the end of the Cold War.
The United States
For nearly 50 years, we have enjoyed a robust alliance with the United States. It offers important direct benefits to Australia, in defence and security terms. Equally important is the fact that the Alliance helps support a strong US strategic engagement in the Region. We regard this as pivotal to the fundamental stability which the Region has enjoyed. The Alliance is founded on common fundamental values and shared interests. It has been periodically reviewed and adapted to changing circumstances.
The Joint Declaration we issued in 1996 the Sydney Statement made clear that the Alliance was no longer based on a common threat, but, on the advancement of common interests in the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific. As the management of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific becomes even more demanding, it is important to intensify co-operation. This is in the interests of all countries in the region, including Australia and China. The security, stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region is profoundly dependent on the relationship between China and the United States.
It is for this reason that we are concerned about current difficulties between the United States and China. In circumstances such as this, we see it as even more important that China and the US work constructively and openly to resolve issues that arise between them.It is important that China continues its policy of greater engagement with the rest of the world.
Notwithstanding recent events, we are encouraged in that regard by recent statements by Chinese leaders. For our part, we will continue to support China’s goals of open, full and co-operative participation in global and regional affairs.
New Defence White Paper
So far, I have shared with you Australia’s perceptions of the challenges for regional security, as well as the roles and responsibilities of both Australia and China within our region. It is important for our two countries to understand how we each view strategic developments in our region, and how our assessments shape the defence policies we pursue. In Australia, one of the most important ways we explain our strategic outlook and policies is through Defence White Papers.
It is my intention to produce a Defence White Paper in the Year 2000. The White Paper will need to take account of developments that are re-shaping our strategic environment. Not only must we carefully measure global events and developments in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, we also must pay close attention to changing circumstances specifically in Southeast Asian countries, particularly Indonesia. We must also carefully analyse the implications of the nuclear weapon tests in India and Pakistan, as well as long-range ballistic missile developments in these 2 countries and the DPRK.
Our new White Paper, therefore, needs to show how Australia’s Defence policy will adapt to meet this changing environment. This is not an easy task. However, a number of key policy elements already stand out in the directions established by the Australian Government.
Established Policy Elements
First, Australia will maintain the more outward-looking Defence policy that my Government developed in the 1997 statement, Australia’s Strategic Policy. This is because we recognise that our security is closely tied to the security of the countries around us. Australia will continue to work with our friends and neighbours, doing what we can to contribute to building peace and stability in our region.
The Government has made many demands of the Defence Force. In particular, we require it to be ready to undertake a variety of tasks, often at short notice. We see this as a vital contribution to shaping our strategic environment in ways that support our interests and the interests of our friends.
The White Paper must tackle some hard questions about how we sustain high levels of current readiness, as well as a demanding future investment program.
The point I want to highlight is that Australia has, in the past, shared its thinking on these matters with allies, neighbours and friends. Australia has every interest in being an open and consultative Defence partner.
We will again use the White Paper as a vehicle for enhancing the important strategic dialogues we already share with many countries in the Asia-Pacific.
Australia-China Dialogue
It is our ambition to make China one of our key partners in strategic dialogue. Developments in Northeast Asia can directly affect Australia’s security. More broadly, open dialogue and co-operation between Australia and China can make a significant contribution to the development of a more secure, stable and trusting region. In this regard, we have been particularly pleased with the recent developments in the defence relationship between our two countries. We are confident that this relationship will be of mutual benefit.
Recent months have seen a number of activities which have further consolidated this relationship. In August 1998, General Xiong Guongkai visited Australia for the second of our Annual Strategic Dialogue talks. The 1998 round of semi-official one-and-a-half track" talks took place in China, in October. These talks involved academics and officials participating in their private capacities. December 1998 saw the latest round of Security and Disarmament talks take place in Australia. And the PLA Chief-of-Staff, General Fu, visited Australia in January, this year.
During this time, there also has been a series of senior and working-level visits, and contacts. These valuable contacts have been further enriched by General Chi’s visit to Australia in February last year, and my present visit to China.
China and Australia share a commitment to dialogue and confidence-building. We see these things as mechanisms which help reduce the risk of misunderstanding, and minimise tensions which could otherwise lead to conflict.
Conclusion
The Asia-Pacific region has tremendous potential to deliver security and increasing prosperity to all its inhabitants. We face many formidable challenges to realising this potential.
Strong, open and transparent bilateral relationships, including those in the defence field, will be an essential tool to overcoming these challenges.
Finally, let me repeat how pleased I am to be here, as the first Australian Defence Minister to visit China. The reciprocal visits by our two countries’ Defence Ministers represent a pinnacle in the relationship.
I hope that reaching this crest will enable us to look further ahead, and to use the relationship to advance common interests. It clearly is in both our countries’ interests to maintain dialogue, and to develop understanding on regional security issues. I think it is also in the interests of the wider region that we do so.
So, I look forward to more fruitful dialogue and deepening institutional contacts which will lead to greater confidence and mutual understanding.
Thank you.
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