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Speech by Mr. José Cutileiro, Secretary-General of the W.E.U., during the autumn session of the W.E.U. Assemnly, Paris, Nov. 30 |
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(official translation)
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President, members of the Assembly, members of the Permanent Council, ladies and gentlemen, we have come together in this chamber once again, on the occasion of the WEU Assembly autumn session, which is taking place at a particularly interesting time. The British initiative presented in recent months by Mr Blair in Portsch, Mr Robertson in Vienna and Mr Cook in Rome has been instrumental in relaunching the debate on European security at the very time when we have two important dates in our diaries for 1999, namely the NATO Summit in Washington and the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty.
Taking stock on the eve of 1999, what do we find Monetary Europe is coming into being because there is a will behind it that security Europe has so far lacked. Does this mean that, faced with the upheavals of this world of ours, we are condemned at best to play second fiddle or at worst find ourselves powerless spectators in security matters, or are we ready to move forward From the recent debates following the presentation of the British initiative and, especially, from our ministerial meeting in Rome, there has, I believe, emerged an awareness of the need to address the fundamental issues if we really wish to maintain our position on the international stage.
Much has been said and written in the last few months, about WEU's future. In October some people had given it up for dead but in November it revived, not quite the same but not altogether different, strengthened or absorbed. Such speculations are not without interest but I do not think they should take priority. I entirely agree with the views expressed by Mr Robertson in Vienna in October. We must stop discussing questions of theology and obscure institutional distinctions. Our endless discussions, fascinating though they may, will not impress anyone, and certainly not, for a start, public opinion in our various countries. We shall be judged by our actions.
We are all agreed on how matters stand. NATO is the cornerstone of European defence. WEU, which is an integral part of the development of the European Union, is the crisis management instrument available to Europeans for operations in which the United States does not wish to be directly involved. We are also all agreed on the diagnosis. Europe is suffering essentially from a double deficit a lack of political credibility and a lack of operational credibility. I also think that a common objective is emerging to gain in credibility in these two areas by gaining in autonomy, which is not at odds with the transatlantic link. On the contrary, it would help to strengthen it. The question we now have to address is how to achieve our objective. Clearly, we will never achieve anything without political will, without European solidarity, and without coherent and effective military capabilities. The very first thing, therefore, is that we must be able to take decisions together. Here, a genuine CFSP would undoubtedly help, but in the meantime, institutionally speaking, there is nothing to prevent us from taking decisions.
The composition of WEU is sometimes regarded as an impediment to rapid decision making. That is not the case, and I have three remarks to make on the subject. Decisions in WEU are taken by the ten full member states, all of which are also members of the European Union and NATO, and alone have a right of veto in the WEU Council. WEU is the only body that brings together all the European members of NATO, who take part in our Military Staff, and all the members of the European Union. This is no small advantage when we consider that WEU would probably act at the request of the European Union and, in certain cases, would be calling on NATO assets and capabilities. These countries now number 18 and will shortly become 21 with the entry into NATO of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. On the basis of political negotiations, WEU has worked out arrangements that enable them to participate fully in WEU-led Petersberg-type operations.
In addition, WEU also has ten central European countries at its Council table. Thus WEU brings together a total of 28 countries that share common interests and it therefore seems vital to take care not to break existing solidarities, which are factors of stability and security.
WEU's position between the European Union and NATO is sometimes described as an obstacle to the decision-making process. I have just two observations to make in this connection. First, WEU's position in this regard is a recent one, based on decisions taken in the last seven years. It assumes that WEU benefits from the European Union's political influence and can rely on NATO assets and capabilities. We have come a long way in terms of real cooperation with these two organisations in recent years.
As far as NATO is concerned, we are on the point of finalising an important document on the transfer, monitoring and return of NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations. This document should be ready by the time of the Washington Summit meeting. We have also begun to prepare the first joint WEU-NATO exercise, CMX/CRISEX 2000.
As far as the European Union is concerned, our two organisations have already drawn much closer together, even before the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. In particular, we are just taking the very first steps to practical implementation of two decisions taken on the basis of Article J.4.2 of the Treaty on European Union. We have received a first request for action, namely to coordinate, supervise and train mine clearance specialists and instructors in Croatia, and a second quest to monitor the situation in Kosovo, for which the WEU Council has instructed our Satellite Centre to carry out general security surveillance of the Kosovo region.
We should therefore proceed with caution and not call everything into question prematurely. How can we, without openly repudiating all the decisions taken at Maastricht, Amsterdam, Berlin and Madrid, decide that the mechanisms and procedures put in place on the basis of those decisions are inadequate at the very time when they are just being finalised and have not yet been put to the test?
Secondly, if we wish to be serious and not for ever play the part of sorcerers' apprentices, it seems to me to be important that we address ourselves to building on the progress already achieved and, in particular, to ensuring by means of exercises that our links with these two organisations are sufficiently well-defined, clear, coherent and understood by all for everything to proceed as effectively and as rapidly as possible once the decision has been taken to push the button". Clearly, too, our own internal functioning can and must be improved.
(The speaker continued in English) The political will to act together would not be sufficient by itself. We must also be able to act together and here we come to the question of the Europeans' capabilities. A determined political voice that could not rely on strong operational capabilities would be remarkably powerless. Of course, Europeans are not entirely without resources. We must endeavour to acquire the capabilities that we now lack - essentially, satellite intelligence and strategic mobility - and to develop the efficiency and cohesion of our existing assets. I will quote two figures in this connection that seem to be highly significant. In 1997, defence expenditure accounted for 3.4%. of the GDP in the United States, compared with an average of 1.9%. for the European members of NATO, excluding Greece and Turkey.
Crisis management operations are multinational and joint operations. The armed forces of our various countries must therefore be able to work together. We all know how much remains to be done in this area: it has been recently discussed at length in the course of various meetings and conferences. I welcome this debate but, here again, we shall be judged not by our words but by our actions, and action is needed on a number of fronts. I offer a few examples.
The modernisation and adaptation of our armed forces to meet the new strategic challenges is not proceeding at the same pace in our various countries. If these discrepancies are not remedied they will eventually have a highly adverse effect on the effectiveness of any joint operation that we may undertake. The necessary efforts in this connection are a matter for the nations concerned. The Europeans already have a number of multinational forces, which must be truly adapted to meet European needs in crisis management operations. We must satisfy ourselves that they meet the essential requirements of flexibility, mobility and ease of deployment. They should also be better coordinated. In the course of conferences organised by our Military Staff and attended by the Forces Answerable to WEU, it became very clear that joint training exercises should be organised.
As the President just said, the Europeans also have the WEU Satellite Centre. I need not tell Members of the Assembly that observation satellite systems are likely to play a crucial part in strengthening WEU's operational capabilities. For some time now, the WEU Space Group has been evaluating possible WEU participation in an independent developing multilateral European programme. It is important that these investigations continue and be carried through to a successful conclusion.
Last but not least, there is our defence industry. Here too coherence and efficiency must be our watchwords. Figures often speak louder than words, so here are some figures: on research and development, the United States spends six times as much as Europe and its expenditure is shared among one third the number of companies. As for the number of different weapons systems produced at the beginning of the 1990s, Europe produced four main battle tanks while the United States produced one; Europe produced 16 armoured vehicles for infantry while the United States produced three; Europe produced seven anti-tank helicopters while the United States produced five; Europe produced eight anti-aircraft missiles while the United States produced four; and Europe produced 11 frigates while the United States produced one. If it were rugby, we would be winning, but in this case the higher the number the worse off we are.
I need not go on. It is absolutely clear that we must rationalise our efforts in this sector and, in the absence for the time being of any real standardisation, our immediate concern must be at least to improve inter-operability of the equipment used. Some steps have already been taken in this direction and appreciable progress has been made in the past two years. Such steps have in most cases been initiatives on the part of certain countries and it is important to stress that they must be made open to the others to avoid rifts. They are also much more industrial than political. However, some political initiatives should be mentioned, such as the establishment of the Western European Armaments Organisation and OCCAR , the letter of intent signed by the four OCCAR countries and by Sweden and Spain and the master plan proposed by the Western European Armaments Group and aimed at establishing a genuine European armaments agency.
I should also mention the role played by the Commission, which is actively working to improve market conditions. Nevertheless, we still have a long way to go. In particular, we are still far from our real goal, which is to have, in some sense, a single European military customer. We must therefore rapidly and seriously address the fundamental issue of harmonisation of operational needs. In Rome, in October, the WEU Military Committee requested the Military Delegates' Committee to submit to it, at its next meeting in April 1999, a consolidated situation report on current approaches on the identification of military operational requirements included in force and armaments planning. I very much hope that this way WEU will be able to contribute to the harmonisation of future military operational requirements.
In conclusion, I must say that my concern, as a European, is that Europe should be fully credible on all fronts. As Secretary-General of WEU, I feel I should add that WEU's development since the beginning of the decade has taken full account of the decisions that Europeans have taken in order to adapt to the new strategic challenges. Not only is WEU now capable of conducting certain operations, but it can provide the focal point for the various efforts that are being and will be undertaken to strengthen Europeans' operational capabilities in the various areas that I mentioned.
Crises will not wait for us to finish talking. They are already upon us. Various organisations are ready to respond, and there must be complementarity between those organisations, not duplication., I repeat, I do not think that we ought to be focusing our attention on institutional matters at present. The existing institutional arrangements allow us to act with due respect for existing solidarities and the necessary coordination and complementarity between organisations.
The problems that we face are the fundamental ones of political will and the ability to act. They will not be solved by further institutional tinkering. I am sure that we are all sufficiently well aware of the seriousness of this matter not to shirk our real responsibilities by hiding behind a smoke screen of empty debate.
Thank you for your attention.
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--ends--
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