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The Issues in Defence Policy |
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(Source: UK Ministry of Defence; issued Nov. 27, 2003)
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Speech by Geoff Hoon, UK Secretary of State for Defence,
to the City Forum,
London, Nov. 27, 2003
I have been setting out for some months now the challenges facing the Ministry of Defence, setting the scene for the changes in posture, planning and procurement within the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces which lie ahead. As we have prepared to meet new threats and learned to operate in a changing strategic environment, I have argued the need for these developments.
Today I would like to give you an insight into where this thinking has taken us.
Next month the Ministry of Defence will publish a Defence White Paper to Parliament. It will provide a comprehensive picture for the future of Defence Policy. It will set out the new strategic environment today and as we anticipate it will be in the future – outlining the security and policy baseline against which future decisions will be made. Today I am grateful for the opportunity to once again outline some of the principles that will underpin this important piece of work.
SETTING THE SCENE
At the end of the Cold War we entered a period of rapid international change. The Cold War certainties and, to some degree strategic security disappeared. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War the then government grasped the need for rapid changes, although their policy was focused, more on reduction than rebalancing. The Strategic Defence Review in 1998 brought our thinking on all defence issues up to date.
Its conclusions remain broadly correct today. It stated that we needed to move into an expeditionary era, to build in greater flexibility to face the increasingly diverse threats ahead both for war fighting and peace support operations.
This need to operate both in small-scale, fluid situations, as well as to retain an ability to undertake large-scale combat operations has been amply demonstrated in recent years. Our Armed Forces have been engaged in successful combat operations in Iraq this year, and are still heavily involved in post-conflict activities. And over the past five years we have also conducted a number of small to medium scale operations – often concurrently – across three continents in countries such as Kosovo, Macedonia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The changes brought about by the SDR enabled us to carry out these tasks so successfully. But events have shown us that our planning cannot stand still. The SDR could not have anticipated the appalling events of 11 September 2001, nor their strategic effects.
Within a few weeks of that day the foreign and security policies of many governments, not least our key ally in Washington, had changed markedly. Soon afterwards UK troops were fighting in Afghanistan. All of this stemmed from one group of co-ordinated attacks on a single day.
So, as a result of the end of the Cold War new terrorist threats and of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, our expeditionary stance will be the template for our future operations. We can no longer wait to defend ourselves against attack – it would be too late. We must take on our enemies before they can attack us, by denying terrorists safe havens, and by changing the economic and social environments in which terrorism can flourish.
All of this means we must be able to deploy fast and send sustainable and flexible forces capable of fighting in diverse perhaps hostile environments. Those forces must be able to link in quickly and effectively with our allies when they get there. Therefore the key themes will be: agility, flexibility and adaptability.
Why have we reached this conclusion? One of the Ministry of Defence’s most important roles is looking to the future and then planning to meet future challenges. I want to share with you some of our thoughts.
The probability of a large-scale conventional attack on Europe is now fortunately very remote. The shadow of the Cold War has gone from Europe; NATO and Russia are developing a close working relationship and their Armed Forces have deployed alongside one other in the Balkans. However, new threats are emerging and we must be prepared to respond to this changing strategic environment. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the threat posed by international terrorism – demonstrated once again by the shocking events in Istanbul last week – and the consequences of failing or failed states present us with real and immediate challenges.
These threats are experienced by all civilised nations. It follows therefore that we are likely to operate, in the main, with allies and partners – with NATO, the EU or in coalitions of the willing. In many, but not in all cases, these will include the United States, especially where large-scale operations are concerned.
THE CONTEXT
The security and stability of Europe and the maintenance of the transatlantic relationship are fundamental to our security and defence. More widely, our security and national prosperity depend on broad global stability, freedom and economic development and the continuing flow of natural resources. In support of these aims, the United Kingdom’s Armed Forces will continue to act as a force for good within the international community. We know that, ultimately, we will achieve security not through the use of force alone, but by changing attitudes and by bringing security to those regions where there is a risk of instability. That is a job not just for those of us in Defence, but for all of us in Government.
REGIONAL ANALYSIS
So from where do we judge that future threats to the peace and security of the UK will come? Europe and those regions immediately adjacent to it – the near East, North Africa and the Gulf – are likely to continue to have the most significant bearing on both our own and wider Western security interests. Potentially destabilising social, political, and economic problems demand that we – and others across Whitehall – engage in conflict prevention, as well as responding quickly to emerging crises.
The Middle East presents the most significant security challenge. The Israeli/Palestinian problem is a major regional issue; the United Kingdom will continue to support international efforts to secure a lasting settlement. The Gulf will remain the key region of strategic importance, with its energy supplies being crucial to the world economy. Although recent operations have neutralised one threat, weapons of mass destruction have proliferated across the Middle East and beyond and will be a continuing concern.
Looking beyond the regions adjacent to Europe, we must recognise that there will be a greater need for commitments further afield. Of course, crises could occur anywhere across the world and the UK will not be able, nor required, to help in every case. Our focus, therefore, is likely to be on those areas where we have strong historical ties and responsibilities, although we will always be ready to play a part wherever we feel we should.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
The threats we face are global. They have no respect for national boundaries. We are all threatened, as the events of the last 18 months have shown. The responsibility for meeting these threats falls globally, to us all. So where military action is required, it will be most effective both tactically and strategically when it comes in the form of partnerships, alliances and coalitions.
To enable this to happen there will be a need for the Armed Forces of allies, present and future, to link together on the battlefield through technology. I will deal with this in more detail later.
The United Nations will play a central role in all this. It will remain the forum through which the international community can best address major security crises. We will therefore seek to foster a strong Security Council, and support efforts to improve the UN’s performance in peace support operations. However, we need to be realistic about the limitations of the UN and the difficulties of translating broad consensus on goals into specific actions, particularly where proactive military intervention is concerned.
For the United Kingdom, the key organisations through which we act will be NATO and the European Union. NATO will remain the cornerstone of our collective defence and for crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic area. It is also the most important transatlantic organisation, through which the US will engage with its allies in planning and conducting military operations.
The EU – through its common foreign and security policy and through the European Security and Defence Policy will provide a complementary organisation through which we can act when NATO as a whole is not ultimately involved.
Established relationships and coalition frameworks provide a strong base from which to assemble a military response and facilitate planning, deployment and operations. However, both NATO and the EU will need to further develop their expeditionary and crisis management capabilities in order to be able to deploy effective forces in this rapidly changing world. This means investing in modern, well-equipped military forces to do the job.
NATO members embraced this concept at last year’s Prague Summit and agreed to develop a more capable military Alliance to meet crises and contingencies as they arise. The UK is committed to significant contributions to NATO capabilities and there is a strong will amongst Alliance members to move forward quickly. The catalyst for this capability development will be the NATO Response Force, with its emphasis on flexible, deployable and interoperable forces. The success of the initiatives agreed at Prague will be a litmus test of the Alliance's willingness to transform itself.
The UK is a strong supporter of developing EU military capability on a basis that supports and complements NATO. The EU, with its focus on crisis management operations outside the Union, is now establishing the military structures required to support it. Having said that, shortfalls remain to be met before the Helsinki Headline Goal is achieved in full. The EU has already conducted limited Peace Support Operations in both Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. But considerable progress, particularly in developing relevant and credible capabilities, is still needed.
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENCE
I have already set out the increasing frequency and range of UK involvement in small and medium scale operations. The need for multiple, concurrent small to medium sized operations will be the most significant factor in our force planning. Counter-terrorism and counter proliferation operations in particular will require rapidly deployable forces able to respond swiftly to intelligence and achieve precise effects in a range of environments across the world.
Regional tensions and potential conflicts are likely to create a sustained high demand for enduring peace support commitments, such as the extended deployments that we have seen in the Balkans. But we must also retain the capacity to reconfigure our forces to undertake large-scale operations of the type we saw in Iraq earlier this year, albeit less frequently.
The most demanding expeditionary operations, such as Operation TELIC in Iraq, can only plausibly be conducted if US forces are engaged. Where the UK chooses to be involved we would want to be in a position to influence political and military decision-making. This will involve sharing the risk, and require an ability for our Armed Forces to play a meaningful role alongside those of the US. The key to retaining interoperability with the US, for our European allies as well as for the UK, is likely to rest in the successful operation of NATO’s new Allied Command for Transformation.
EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS AND NEC
All this new thinking needs to be put into action, of course. Whatever our planning and our equipment, it is ultimately the people who use them who deliver success. That means giving them the best equipment we can, maximising the effects of what we have, dispensing with systems and structures which are no longer sufficiently effective.
Historically, military capability has been measured in terms of units or the number of platforms – ships, aircraft and tanks. The approach then was to acquire sheer volume – to ensure success against possible opponents in what was effectively a war of attrition. But in today’s environment, success will be achieved through an ability to act quickly, accurately and decisively so as to deliver critical effect at the right moment.
We will have only limited opportunities to act against a more disparate, better-hidden and more mobile enemy than ever. We need to therefore move quickly to deliver critical effect at the right moment.
Consequently, calculations of military power in terms of numbers of escort vessels, tanks and fighter aircraft are not yet irrelevant, but they are certainly much less useful than focusing on the joint capabilities required to achieve strategic effects.
So what are the critical elements in delivering military effect? The answer is threefold: sensors – to gather information; an effective network – to fuse communicate and exploit that information; and strike assets – to deliver the decisive action. Technology will be a key driver for change and will present us with new opportunities – for example the effective means by which to link ‘sensor to shooter’ through Network Enabled Capabilities. And by thinking about capability jointly rather than as a collection of separate platforms, the effects that can be delivered can far exceed the sum of the parts. This will provide considerable opportunity when we consider the requirements for future force structures it will place a premium on flexible and adaptable Network Enabled Capabilities.
We plan to put significant resources into Network Enabled Capabilities. We are already investing in a range of sensors, including airborne stand-off surveillance battlefield electronic warfare capabilities and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. We are also developing new systems to collate, analyse and distribute information, which will improve communication and understanding of strategic and military intent throughout the chain of command. The final pieces of the jigsaw are the precision attack capabilities represented by submarine launched Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles, air delivered Storm Shadow long-range cruise missiles, enhanced precision guided munitions, and a range of land and special forces.
However, the introduction of any new technology – and Network Enabled Capabilities are no exception – is only effective when employed by highly trained highly professional forces. Alongside the investment in Network Enabled equipment, we will also invest in the training of the people that operate them to ensure they have the skills needed to realise the potential benefits.
It is also important to emphasise that it is the armed forces' determination to change, not to rest on the laurels of their many successes, and to look to the future whilst celebrating the past which has delivered effective forces. Contrary to popular belief, the military handles change better than most private sector organisations: it has had to, for no company has seen its strategic environment change as fast or as often as the Armed Forces.
We are committed to providing Service personnel with the support that they need. In yesterday’s Queen’s Speech we announced measures to bring in new pension and compensation arrangements for the Armed Forces. These will offer a high level of assurance for Service personnel appropriate to the demands of military service.
CAPABILITY IMPLICATIONS
Everything I have set out so far revolves around change. The White Paper, in setting the Policy context, will shape the structure of our armed forces for many years ahead. Within that overall shape, we will need to develop the details of individual systems and units. However, before we can do that, we need to be certain that we have the procurement and development projects we need to get it right. That is why the Ministry of Defence is now undertaking a significant examination of our capabilities and overheads. This is not a new defence review, nor does it need to be. But it is, if you like, a final check on our planning to ensure that we have the right capabilities needed for the challenges ahead. That we are spending our finite funds in the best way possible.
CONCLUSIONS
Much of what I've outlined leads to the conclusion that one of the greatest risks to our peace and security is that the strategic environment will change faster than we can understand and adapt to it. Our response must be based around flexible and agile Armed Forces that are structured and equipped to meet these threats. The range of tasks they will have to perform will be broad – from peacekeeping, humanitarian and confidence-building operations through to counter-terrorism and high-intensity combat against a diverse set of potential adversaries.
We have come a long way already, but we still have much to do. It is a testament to the professionalism of our people that they have risen to the challenges of the last few years, but they still will be more effective with the right force structures and equipment behind them. They deserve nothing less. So, we must be ruthless in exploiting new technologies to maximise military effect whilst reducing our reliance on less flexible and less useful force elements.
The UK’s alliances are broad, and whilst working with the US will be a major focus of effort, that will not be sufficient on its own. We will continue to improve our capability to operate with NATO and European allies and encourage the development of expeditionary and crisis management capabilities in order that both organisations play complementary and effective roles in the changing world.
We can no longer expect to predict the future environment by simply projecting the current situation. We must be ready to question accepted wisdom and conventional thinking.
We cannot know everything that lies ahead, but we must plan as well as we can for all eventualities.
This will not be easy and will require tough choices that cannot and should not be avoided if we are ensure our Armed Forces can meet the demands of tomorrow’s security environment.
-ends-
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