The defense reforms begun in 1986 with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act ushered in an era of sweeping change in U.S. military acquisition policies and processes. Reform was necessary to correct genuine deficiencies in the Department of Defense's operational and acquisition practices, but implementation of the 1986 act — and subsequent legislation, including the National Defense Authorization Act of 1987 — resulted in a host of unintended and undesirable consequences, especially in the Department of the Navy (DoN).
Drawing on research, interviews, and their own professional experience, the authors examine both the climate surrounding the development of Goldwater-Nichols and each military service's implementation of the legislation.
They trace the origins, construction, and fortification of the “wall” between DoN's military-run requirements process and the civilian-run acquisition process — a divide inimical to the efficient and effective support of military forces and antithetical to the spirit of the legislation — and investigate the legislation's adverse effects on DoN personnel policies.
Their recommendations focus on breaking down the wall, changing obstructive personnel policies, re-involving the DoN service chiefs in the acquisition process, and restoring some institutional balance.
click here for the report’s (75 pages in PDF format) home page, on the Rand Corp. website.