Mr Beazley's policy announcements on national security reforms today are full of inconsistencies, under-funded promises and proposals already instituted by the Government.
For example Mr Beazley says that "Labor will put the issue of fighting terrorism high on the agenda in Australia's regional security dialogues"(p 11).
This is the same Kim Beazley who is attacking the Prime Minister for attending the APEC Leaders' meeting to specifically discuss international terrorism after Australia requested it be placed on the agenda!
Underpinning his pronouncements today is Mr Beazley's oft-repeated claim that he has superior experience and expertise in the Defence and Security area.
"As Defence Minister of this country for five years I am well acquainted with our security needs, and I will be in a good position to take over Australia's fight against terrorism." (Kim Beazley, Parliament House October 5, 2001)
In fact Mr Beazley stands condemned by his own record. The Opposition Leader left a legacy in Defence of poor decisions, expensive mistakes and a badly unprepared Defence Force.
Collins Submarines Kim Beazley's biggest mistake is still costing the tax payer - more than a decade after he left the job.
The 1999 Macintosh Prescott report which the Government commissioned to get to the bottom of the submarines problems found that: "The essential and visible problem with the Collins Class submarines is that they cannot perform at the levels required for military operations."
In 1986 Mr Beazley rejected claims that the costs of Australia's Collins class submarines would exceed its $2.56 billion dollar budget and boasted they would be delivered on time.
All six submarines are in fact behind schedule by one and a half to three years.
The current approved budget is $5.1 billion and it is estimated that it will cost up to $1.5 billion dollars to finally fix all the problems which have ranged from noisy propellers to unsatisfactory combat systems.
East Timor When Defence Minister Kim Beazley had a narrow focus on the 'sea air' gap to our north.
Because of this focus the Army was not properly resourced and was allowed to languish. Army's own assessment said: "Units are not adequately prepared for combat. Army lacks sufficient combat power...with some exceptions units are understaffed, poorly equipped and have a low readiness level."
It was only because the Coalition immediately began a process of rebuilding the Army when it took office in 1996 that we were able to deploy troops to East Timor.
Simply put, under Kim Beazley's policies the Army could not have mounted that operation.
Personnel When Labor came to office in 1983 there were almost 73,000 full time service personnel.
This figure had dropped to 58,000 by the time the Coalition took office.
A 1998 Joint Parliamentary Report on personnel wastage in the ADF found that total ADF separations increased from 9.4% in 1983/84 to 13.2 % in 1987/88.
The resignation rate of RAAF pilots in 1987/88 increased by over 300% over the rate in 1983. 123 pilots resigned in 1987/88 when only 60 were graduating.
Funding Kim Beazley's 1987 White Paper stated that, if the Government was to achieve the levels of Defence capability and priorities reflected in the Paper, there was a need for an allocation of resources within the order of 2.6% - 3% of GDP.
Mr Beazley failed to meet his own pass rate.
When he left the position of Defence Minister Defence spending was 2.1%. By the time Labor left office the figure was 1.9%.
Reserves A 1991 parliamentary report into the ADF reserves found the Army Reserves was "generally ineffective in meeting its readiness objectives in allocated roles".
Under Kim Beazley the number of reserves dropped from 28920 in 1983-84 to 23747 in 1989-90 : a decline of 17%.
Coast Guard Kim Beazley has today released what he calls a policy for a Coast Guard. He himself dismissed a Coast Guard as too expensive and unnecessary when he was Minister. He found then it would cost $2 billion dollars in today's dollars.
His estimated cost of $220 million will be found by robbing customs, fisheries and other agencies - thereby weakening their operational capability.
A recent parliamentary Committee report into Coastwatch heard evidence which suggested that the very minimum a Coast Guard would cost would be in the order of $500 million dollars.
Kim Beazley in his policy today says it will cost just an additional $10 million in "start up and administration costs".
His plan relies primarily on stripping the Royal Australian Navy of 15 surface response vessels (Patrol Boats) and the 600 people who crew and maintain them and handing them to a new bureaucracy.
Kim Beazley released this Coast Guard plan in January 2000. He had had almost two years to substantiate his arguments but the policy he is offering the Australian people today amounts to 10 paragraphs of generalisations and unrealistic costings. (ends)
Kim Beazley Flip Flops On Coast Guard And Defence White Paper Kim Beazley's Record