Late in 1994 the Keating Government developed a program for a helicopter which would be able to operate from our Anzac Class Frigates. The tenders were let in 1995 and the contracts finally signed by the Howard Government in 1997.
The Super Seasprite Program is budgeted all up for around A$1 billion. It is intended to deliver penguin missile technology from the Super Seasprite helicopter to support anti-ship warfare from our Anzac frigates and in doing so complement the harpoon missile system in both the FFG and the Anzac frigates.
The concern that I have is that the project, due largely to problems with the prime contractor, Carmen [actually Kaman, ED] and some other technical difficulties, this project is now five years behind. The Director of Naval Aviation has had no choice but to ground the helicopters until recent further software problems have been resolved.
Late in March I specifically asked the Chief of Navy and the Chief of Defence to develop and provide me with all of the options that the government might consider: what is the way ahead; how can these problems be fixed; how certain can we be about making sure that the Super Seasprite is able to deliver what was promised by our contractors. Alternatively what modifications could we make to the program and at what cost, and what sort of capability might we get.
And thirdly I have also asked them to provide me with the option in terms - and thirdly I have asked the Department of Defence to provide me with the option of the government considering removing itself completely from the Super Seasprite Program.
At the moment the government has made no decision at all. I have simply asked defence to provide me with the three major options that we could consider: that is continuing with the program and at what cost, and when would we get the capability; secondly what modifications could be made to the program and at what cost, and what would we get; and thirdly what would be involved were the government to decide to get out of Super Seasprite altogether, how would the capability be delivered and at what cost.
The fundamental problem here is that throughout the nineties this project was entered into - and it would never be entered into today. In plain language what we are endeavouring to do with this overly ambitious program is to fit the equivalent of 2006 Holden electronic technology into an EH.
The Super Seasprite is a very good airframe, however it is one that has aged and we are trying to fit state-of-the-art technology into it. The navy has worked tirelessly - and under no circumstances should anyone be critical of the navy itself for the problems that we have. Australia and the Australian Defence Force has been let down by the software; in some cases by the contractors that have been involved; and it also should be emphasised that this is a fixed price contract and the contractors are required to deliver on the capability.
So in other words the price is not increasing, the contractors went into a fixed price arrangement, and I'm determined on behalf of the Australian taxpayer to get to the bottom of this. We need to work out can we deliver it; if so at what cost; when are we going to get the Super Seasprite fully operational; and if we can't what other choices have we got.
-ends-
Grounding of Seasprites : Statement by Brendan Nelson, Minister for Defence
