PARIS --- In a keynote speech delivered at the “Gesellschaft für die Sicherheitspolitik” conference on Nov. 27, the chairman of the Germany's conservative CDU party, Mr. Friedrich Merz, outlined his considerations on defence. More than a speech and without giving too many details, it is a revolution in the strategy and the principles. From the very beginning, Mr. Merz's speech made it clear that he would end the defence policy of former Chancellor and party leader Angela Merkel. For Merkel, the Bundeswehr had little political and diplomatic relevance and therefore was constantly underfinanced.
For the CDU chairman, it is high time Germany developed a strategic culture: Germany is not sufficiently able to “put together the pieces of the puzzle that lie in front of us,” to recognize the situation and then draw the right conclusions and conclusions. In this context, he explicitly referred to the uncertainties of U.S politics after the 2024 presidential election. It cannot be ruled out that “the U.S will leave us to fend for ourselves with our wars and conflicts on our continent and on our periphery," he said.
The first practical consequence is the obligation to massively finance the Bundeswehr: “We are in favor of increasing the defence budget to at least two percent of the gross domestic product by 2026, in addition to the special fund.” Two percent would mean jumping the military budget from €52Bn to €80bn, in addition to the €100 billion Bundeswehr Special Fund, until it runs out in 2027. Merz's financial plans for the armed forces can now be understood as meaning that the CDU and and Bavarian offshoot CSU want to return to their previous role of the "parties of the Bundeswehr." In the past, the CDU/CSU liked to so describe themselves, pointing out that no party does or will do more for the armed forces than they do.
The second conclusion is to improve the relations with the defence industry in three directions:
-- as a strategic industry, the defence companies are not commercial enterprises like others. They would have to be financed even if “we don’t need them acutely politically,” which implies "maintaining capabilities in order to be able to react in crises and war.”
-- “The argument of national security must be taken into account when making procurements,” a remark which can be understood as a indirectly condemning the non-European or non-German acquisitions of the Special Fund;
-- A new course in the arms export policy. Strategic partners who are not members of NATO or the EU could be tied to Germany through arms export deals: “If we don’t support these partners in terms of arms policy, the gap will be filled by those whose influence we should better contain.” The “partners” are likely to mean India, Indonesia, Singapore, and South Korea, which are currently under the scope of the defence industry.
In all and viewed from Paris, London or even Rome and Madrid, this speech may seem to be trivial, because these guidelines are so obvious that it is hardly credible that the Germans, and the CDU in particular, did not adopt them long before, and have forgotten since 1990 the key lessons of former defence ministers (Strauss, Schmidt, Werner to quote the most prominent ones).
Interestingly, this speech takes up the main lines developed by the current Defence Minister, Boris Pistorius. In 2025, both men could be rivals in the chancelor's race, but seem to share the same view of defence affairs. Which is, in itself, a revolution.
About the author: Alistair Davidson is a seasoned military advisor, specialist in transatlantic relations and European geopolitics whose views do not necessarily reflect those of the institution for which he works.
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