PARIS --- The series of breakdowns affecting the PUMA tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle since 2015 - not to mention the financial waste for German taxpayers - fully confirms what the most pessimistic analysts have been writing about German defence procurement for years: Germany is unable to conduct a single defence program and to maintain critical weapon systems in service.
The reason for this utterly German failure is not money but the whole system of planning, designing and conducting weapon systems.
In every aspect, the PUMA-fiasco has turned into what Johann Wadephul, the leader of the Christian Democrat parliamentary group (CDU), described as a “nightmare” during an interview to broadcaster ARD. "The Puma should be the main weapon system of the German army. And if the Puma is not operational, then the army is not operational," he said.
While one can agree with Mr. Wadephul’s observations, the cases behind the nightmare are even worse that the nightmare itself…
The PUMA: a purely German failure in procurement
The PUMA is not a joint program involving a lot of foreign partners, such as the A400M, the EF-2000 or the Eurodrone: it is a pure German defence program. As such, it demonstrates how the German procurement system is massively at fault.
The BAAiNBW, the defence procurement authority, is the main cause; by changing the PUMA mission profile several times since the mid-1990s, it ordered too many changes. Instead of being used for static warfare in Europe, the IFV had to be ready for overseas deployments such as Afghanistan. This meant that the vehicle had to be protected not primarily against fire from the front sector, but from all sides.
However, such a change has a chain of unintended consequences: it requires the reinforcement of armour that went beyond the specifications for weight and dimensions. In order for Puma to be loaded onto military aircraft, dismountable side armour was installed.
The distribution of production work also proved to be a disadvantage. Since the Puma was built at different locations, no two vehicles are the same, according to representatives of the Bundeswehr. Even its dimensions did not match in many cases. Hence major and unbelievable consequences such as water leaks in the turret when it rained or the integration problems with the MELLS anti-tank missile.
The instability of requirements has already caused major setbacks to crucial weapon systems (such as the F-125, the A400M and of course, most recently, the Eurodrone with the two-engine configuration). The reason can certainly to be found in a doctrine torn between foreign obligations (NATO, EU and UN) and the pacifist feelings of the population and MPs, still reluctant to engage the Bundeswehr outside the German borders. By dint of willing to be ready for every mission, everywhere, the PUMA is unable to perform a single one on a simple training exercise ground.
The PUMA-fiasco: a purely German failure in its centre of excellence
What is downright worrying is the fact that the fiasco concerns one of the so-called centres of excellence of Germany: land systems. Better in land and sea-systems than in aerospace, the German defence industry has proved to be very bad in its core-domains.
Before the PUMA crashed on a training ground in Munster, some other iconic programs of the German quality have failed. The K130 corvettes of the 1st and 2nd batch have witnessed so many problems that batch One is to be replaced by a potential Batch 3, just a decade after it entered service, while Batch 2 is suffering major problems of sensor, weapons and software integration.
The F-125 frigate and the U-212 submarine programs encountered major delays, cost-overruns and under-performance to the point that the German political leadership decided to go to a Dutch shipbuilder (Damen) for its next project, the F-126 frigate, in a rare but spectacular humiliation. Will the same inglorious fate await the PUMA, supposed to be the core competences of German defence products?
The PUMA-fiasco: a purely German industrial failure
The overall picture would be incomplete if we forget to include the two compagnies responsible for the production. They are also both responsible for the fiasco and for two reasons. One, they both have bad relations with each other.
The reasons lie beyond the IFV, in their race for the supremacy in Germany and in Europe. For decades, KMW was the sole prime-contractor and integrator of land systems in Germany for domestic and export programs. It has developed a real capability in design, production, integration and trials of heavy land systems, MBTs, bridge-layers and vehicles. Hence, the success-story of the Leopard 1&2, purchased by 15 countries and a word-class standard for main battle tanks, whose major upgrades (1A1 to 2A7) were mechanically followed by customers in the user club LEOBEN.
With the arrival of Armin Papperger as CEO in January 2013 – a decade ago - the old Rheinmetall awakened as did Siegfried with the mythic Brünhild. His ambition is to take the full lead of the land systems in Germany and on the export markets. The rivalry began with the contract in Indonesia (2013) where Rheinmetall has sold 103 Leopard tanks (62 LEO RI + 42 LEO 2A4), 42 Marder 1A2 infantry fighting vehiles, and 11 engineer vehicles for a total of €216 million, and has never ceased.
Rivals in strategy, KMW and Rheinmetall are also rivals in products. Rheinmetall has always played a double game, introducing competing products. Against the PUMA, Rheinmetall has marketed the LYNX, sold to Hungary (218 for €2Bn) and being promoted in Australia (pending) and in Eastern Europe (but defeated in Slovakia and Czech Republic by the CV90). Against the future MGCS, it designed the KF-51 Panther tank using its own money. Each time, it claimed that its products were not competing KMW’s gamut but, in practice, that is indeed the case.
Facing the instability of the BAAiNBW unable to stabilize its requirements, the two companies do not trust each other, as TKMS does with Lürssen Werft/NVL and German Naval Yards-Kiel.
This long-standing mistrust between German players partly explain the current failures that the Bundeswehr and the taxpayers have to fix.
About the author: Alistair Davidson is a seasoned military advisor, specialist in transatlantic relations and European geopolitics who expresses himself here freely, in a personal capacity. His position and opinions are strictly personal and does not involve the institution for which he works.
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