U.S. Defense Department Drafts New Battery Plan to Support Expanding Drone Fleets

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U.S. Defense Department Drafts New Battery Plan to Support Expanding Drone Fleets

U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Liberty Matthews

The Pentagon is tightening its battery playbook as drones spread across the force. Officials confirm a department-wide battery strategy will be published in early 2026. It builds on the 2023 framework and new direction from Congress. The plan ties standards, safety, supply and stockpile policy to growing demand from small UAS, shipboard systems and undersea vehicles. Leaders expect the strategy to align acquisition with industrial capacity and to reduce exposure to fragile mineral supply chains.

DoD Battery Strategy Timeline

Defense Department officials confirmed the DoD will release its updated battery strategy in 2026. It replaces the 2023 Lithium Battery Strategy, which set early goals for safer fielding, better demand data and incentives for allied and domestic production.

The new document folds those goals into a department wide plan driven by the FY2025 defense policy law. It requires regular briefings to Congress and measurable steps on standardization and supply chain risk.

Section 883 of the FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act directs the Secretary of Defense to coordinate a DoD-wide battery strategy with the services. Senate and committee reports repeat that mandate, and request updates on implementation. That puts timelines, roles and metrics on the record instead of treating batteries as a set of service-level projects.

Responsibility rests with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy. That office has maintained a battery advisor role since before the 2023 framework, and has pushed for unified requirements, dual domestic cell sourcing where practical, and clearer procurement signals. Eric Shields, the department’s senior battery advisor has outlined objectives on standards, safety and procurement tempo in public forums and technical briefings.

Lithium battery failures aboard ships, aircraft and UUVs can cause major damage and mission loss. NAVSEA’s safety program and technical manuals already govern storage, testing and certification across the fleet.

Standardization for Small UAS, Undersea Systems, and Shipboard Power

The Army, Navy and Marine Corps held a joint battery industry day on August 13 at Aberdeen Proving Ground, focusing on shared standards, safety baselines and the key demand signals driving near-term purchases.

An Army power-and-energy lead called the meeting the first time the three services sat down with industry “as an equal partner” on a single set of battery problems. Discussion centered on formats, chemistries, interface controls and timelines.

The Navy’s operational energy team laid out the near-term pain points. Small UAS need higher specific energy without sacrificing safety margins. Undersea vehicles need pressure-tolerant packs with predictable failure modes and clean isolation. Surface combatants need large, maintainable modules that tie into power management and fire suppression.

Where standards start to pay:

  • Cell-to-pack rules that define safe charge windows, thermal barriers, and vent paths for mission loads rather than lab benches.
  • Common electrical and data interfaces so packs swap across radios, sensors, and UAS families without new control logic each time.

Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) sets the framework. Power modules with standardized mechanical, electrical, and data interfaces make upgrades simpler, avoiding the need to redesign entire systems. A MOSA-first battery map lets acquisition teams qualify components once, purchase repeatedly, and switch between suppliers when capacity gets tight. It also makes it easier to swap in new battery chemistries when the risks are manageable.

Safety is still the top priority for any open interface. NAVSEA always treats lithium batteries as hazardous, which shapes how compartments are laid out, how ventilation and detection are handled, and how isolation is managed on ships and in maintenance areas. The revised strategy aims to connect these safety rules to a clearer certification process, helping program offices plan around known testing checkpoints.

Critical Minerals, National Defense Stockpile, and DOE’s $1B Funding

Battery policy doesn’t mean much without the minerals to back it up. Gallium, germanium, antimony, and graphite are either under export restrictions or controlled by a few processing sources. Several studies have shown that most U.S. weapons systems rely on parts made with these materials.

Last week, the Department of Energy rolled out nearly $1 billion to support critical mineral efforts, including mining, processing, recycling, and parts of the magnet supply chain. The funding is spread across programs focused on manufacturing, recovering rare earths from waste, and refining materials. It’s not going to produce new drones directly, but it does help secure battery supply chains and keep key vendors in business long enough to support defense needs.

A complementary line of effort sits in stockpiles and fund tools. The National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund finances buys that buffer against shocks. DPA Title III programs manage market losses when pricing or volumes would otherwise shut U.S. firms out. The Pentagon used these levers for magnets, microelectronics, and missile parts; batteries and precursors are now in the same conversation set. 

Draft and signed orders this year target Chinese systems, restrict federal use, and push domestic production. Those policies force more battery demand into U.S. or allied channels rather than consumer imports. The strategy must assume that shift and secure minerals and cells at the scale implied by federal fleets, state agencies, and defense units. 

Analysis from Govini and others report that many Navy, Air Force, and Army systems depend on components linked to minerals under Chinese export controls. Fluctuations in pricing and licensing delays are already affecting delivery timelines. The success of the 2026 strategy will largely hinge on whether it delivers actionable fixes within active program timelines.

Industry Day Takeaways, MOSA Interfaces, and Testing Needs

The August industry day gave vendors a clearer look at what’s coming. Officials flagged upcoming deals for small UAS platforms and modular power packs used on ships and underwater drones. They called out sizing, enclosures, and BMS telemetry as key areas where shared specs will set the bar for qualification. The goal is to let different battery chemistries fit into the same pack design as mission needs shift.

Both Navy and Army teams pushed the need to speed up certification. Testing eats up time when labs, fire chambers, and telemetry gear become choke points.

DLA documentation also points to ongoing work around BMS security and supplier screening. The logic is simple: open interfaces convey more risk. Power modules that use common protocols need to protect control paths and give clear status updates-even under spoofed loads. Expect new procurement language to require built-in cybersecurity for BMS firmware and update systems.

Officials also flagged a lane for alternate chemistries in niche roles. Sodium-ion cells trade energy density for cost, abundance, and thermal behavior. They fit better in stationary storage and ground kits than in small UAS. The Navy has SBIR work exploring sodium-ion designs for aviation and unmanned systems, but energy density limits keep them out of weight-critical platforms for now. Program managers want credible options that avoid lithium bottlenecks where mass allows.

The department is aiming for dual-domestic or allied cell options where it can, but it won’t hold up deployments trying to land the ideal supply chain. The strategy will outline where allied supply is mandatory, where it’s preferred, and where some risk is acceptable to stay on schedule. It follows the MOSA framework: define interfaces, qualify vendors, and swap components without redesigning the system.

For vendors, the near-term actions are concrete:

  • Align pack designs to MOSA interface guidance and NAVSEA lithium safety constraints.
  • Map cell sourcing and precursor flows against U.S., allied, and controlled-country thresholds; present swap options with lead times and test needs.

China’s export controls on gallium, germanium, and antimony are already pushing up lead times and costs. Stockpiling efforts and new DOE funding help, but they don’t eliminate the risk that comes from relying on a concentrated supply chain. The 2026 document will need to link every procurement lane to specific mineral realities rather than assume the market will sort itself out.


REFERENCE SOURCES

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